THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

No. 4. JULY, 1937. Vol. XXVII.

SIGNS OF THE TIMES

A Christian Marriage Law.

The Marriage Bill, which passed its second reading in the Lords without a division, drew two notable speeches from Dr. Henson and Dr. Barnes. Both Bishops were at pains to shew that they supported Mr. Herbert's Bill, not on the grounds of expediency, nor as a concession made to a semi-paganized society, but because that measure provides a remedy on essentially Christian lines for an intolerable, inhuman and unchristian state of affairs. Both Bishops claimed that they supported the measure not simply as Christian men, but as Bishops of the Church of England. There was no departure in it from the Christian tradition, that tradition as venerated and accepted by the English people.

The Bishop of Birmingham said in debate in support of the Bill that

> 'I intend to vote for the second reading of this Marriage Bill. There is in my opinion nothing in it which can encourage our people to regard marriage lightly. It is, I am convinced, a careful attempt to bring our marriage law into harmony with opinions now held by an overwhelming majority of enlightened Christian people in this country. One of the great merits of the Bill, as it seems to me, is that it will promote morality by lessening the number of irregular unions among working people. I hope that it will also lessen the number of collusive divorces.'

Dr. Barnes made a particularly interesting, and in the situation a peculiarly appropriate, contribution to the debate when he dealt succinctly with the attitude of the English Episcopate towards marriage and divorce from the days of the Reformation. He said:

'In the early sixteenth century the reformers never tired of inveighing against the laxity of the Canon Law and against the frequent decrees of nullity, which multiplied impediments made possible. An English Statute of 1533-34 stated none too strongly:

"Marriages have been brought into such uncertainty that no marriage could be so surely knit or bounden but it should lie in either of the parties' power to prove a pre-contract, a kindred alliance, or a carnal knowledge to defeat the same."

After the Reformation, divorce with right of re-marriage, as you all know, became impossible under the ordinary law of England. The grounds of nullity were so restricted that abuse of the process ended.

This development was the more remarkable in that the great divines among the Reformers were almost unanimous in allowing that divorce was legitimate for adultery and, in general, for cruelty and after prolonged desertion. For example, the *Reformatio Legum* of the Commission under Edward VI would have allowed complete divorce for adultery, desertion and cruelty. The proposals, almost by chance, failed to become law, with the result that England was left until 1857 with as rigid a system as any Christendom has known. Did such rigidity, my Lords, promote social morality? No one who has studied the state of English society as it was in the time of James I or of Charles II, or during the greater part of the eighteenth century, could contend that rigid law prevented sexual licence. If your law is too strict, irregular unions will become so familiar that they are tolerated by public opinion, and thus harm will be done to public morality. . . . Those who contend that divorce has never been accepted by the Church of England . . . have against them the weight of historical fact. . . .

I will pass from the Reformers to the year 1670, when a private Act of Parliament revived an old precedent by allowing a peer to remarry after obtaining a divorce. Did the English bishops in this House indignantly protest? Two of the most distinguished bishops, the High Churchman Cosin of Durham, and Wilkins of Chester, sometime Secretary of the Royal Society, voted for the Bill. Some 450 similar Acts were passed during the next two centuries. There is no evidence whatever that the English bishops made it a principle to oppose those measures. When at length the Divorce Bill of 1857 came up for its second reading in this House, nine bishops voted in the affirmative. Among them were Sumner, then Archbishop of Canterbury, and his great successor, Tait, whom Bryce described as the greatest Archbishop of Canterbury since the Reformation. Finally, . . . in 1920 Archbishop Davidson in this House allowed, to the dis-

comfort of some of his allies, that a complete divorce might be granted for adultery.

In the face of such evidence I must emphatically challenge the suggestion that as a bishop of the Church of England I ought not to vote for the present Bill because re-marriage after divorce is contrary to the traditions of the Church of England. On the one hand, I am convinced that Christ set forth an ideal and left His followers free to legislate so as to give relief from intolerable unions if thereby they did not harm social morality. On the other hand, there is conclusive evidence that this view was at the Reformation accepted by some of the most representative bishops of the Church.'

It seems worth while republishing from Hansard (June 28, 1937) portions of the Bishop of Birmingham's speech omitted from the abbreviated reports in the Press. These extracts indicate that what has now been done by Parliament is only the appropriate sequence of a prolonged effort to free our English Marriage Law from the injustices, inhumanities and immoralities which the Canon Law of the Latin Church, as applied in ecclesiastical courts, permitted and defended.

If this measure passes into law, as we hope it will, we shall possess an English Marriage Law which seeks to be essentially humane in the best sense of that word; and essentially Christian in the best sense of that word, regardless of whether such law is in harmony or disharmony with the Canon Law or with a literalist and legalist interpretation of certain sayings attributed to our Saviour in the New Testament. We shall have got beneath the scriptural letter and the legal precedent to the essential spirit of Christ.

Christianity or Casuistry.

The following paragraph appeared in the *Church Times* of June 25:

'It is not surprising that there has been a good deal of surprise and bewilderment manifested by the announcement of the forthcoming marriage in the Roman Catholic Church of the Assumption, Warwick Avenue, London, of a member of a well-known banking family who was divorced in 1928. The frequent insistence by Roman Catholic apologists on the sanctity and indissolubility of the marriage bond makes the proposed solemnization quite unaccountable in the public mind. Fr. Woodlock, who is to preside at the ceremony, has, indeed, been moved to offer a public explanation. It is that, the bridegroom having been previously married in a register office, that union is regarded as null and void. The distinction between marriages which have received the blessing of the Church and those which have not was unknown to earlier generations of theologians, who held that marriage

is not a Christian privilege but an institution of nature, and by natural law indissoluble. *The Catholic Encyclopædic Dictionary,* published with the Westminster imprimatur as recently as 1930, knows nothing of the theory advanced by Fr. Woodlock. It defines marriage as the contract between a man and a woman by which they are associated and united with one another as a common principle for the generation of children and their education. "Its basis," the article continues, "is the mutual consent of the parties, and its essential properties are unity and indissolubility." The writer goes on to state that, even in the non-sacramental marriage of the unbaptized, the essential properties are the same. It is difficult to see with what validity Fr. Woodlock can argue that a register office marriage is no marriage at all. How is the indissoluble marriage of non-Christians to be effected if not in a register office or in some similar circumstances of publicity?'

We feel as little surprised at the surprise of the *Church Times* as we do at Fr. Woodlock's defence of the Roman action. He writes:

'The Church does not legislate for the non-baptized, but a convert to Christianity may obtain by "Pauline privilege" a divorce under well known conditions from a pagan consort who refuses to live at peace with the convert. . . . A Catholic who is baptized in the Catholic Church makes neither a valid nor sacramental contract if the ceremony is performed "clandestinely" . . . and his marriage has merely civil status.' (*Church Times,* July 2.)

Therefore if the Roman Catholic partner of such a marriage obtains later a legal divorce, he or she can be married to a baptized person in a Roman Catholic church even though their legally divorced partner be still living. It may not unreasonably be asked why the Church of Rome should recognize 'Pauline privilege' as a ground for divorce (*I Cor.* vii, 15) but not Christ's concession twice repeated in the First Gospel (*Mt.* v, 32; xix, 9). When the Church of Rome is acclaimed as unflinchingly defending the indissolubility of marriage, it ought to be recognized that what the Church of Rome defends is not the indissolubility of marriage in general, but the indissolubility of those marriages that have the sanction of the Roman authorities. The Rev. Alfred Fawkes used to remark: 'What you English Churchmen do not understand is that the Church of Rome is a very business-like concern. Theories in her policy always bow to practical considerations.'

Modernist Laymen to the Front.

Since English Modernism arose its leading exponents, with very few exceptions, have been clergymen. This is natural enough for it is the primary duty of the clergy to teach the

Christian religion. Two great exceptions in this succession of clerical modernist publicists were Professor Percy Gardner and Professor F. C. Burkitt. *Exploratio Evangelica* by the former, welcomed by Canon Sanday 'as an eirenicon from culture,' prefaced a remarkable series of contributions to English Modernist literature from the same pen. Professor Burkitt's brilliant and many-sided contributions have laid all schools of thought in the Church under a heavy debt. It is now gratifying to witness a deliberate combination of Modernist laymen intent on imparting, in a popular and positive form, to the rank and file of the laity the contribution which a reverent and competent Modernism has in its power to offer.

Mr. R. B. Henderson, Headmaster of Alleyn's School, who has already won his place as a lay teacher of modern theology and whose services have been suitably recognized by the bestowal of the Lambeth B.D., is the Editor of 'The Interpreter Series'[1] of volumes. Only laymen will contribute to this series, and this we feel will attract many readers who have a feeling that such writers are not likely to be influenced by ecclesiastical considerations or to be compelled to arrive at prescribed conclusions. The first volume of the series is *Belief in God*, by the Editor. Two other volumes in the series by writers of outstanding competence are *Prophets and Priests*, by Professor S. H. Hooke, and *Greek Plays and Modern Problems*, by Dr. J. T. Sheppard, Provost of King's College, Cambridge.

Incredible, Indefensible, Inevitable.

In his recent address to the Canterbury Diocesan Conference, Dr. Lang, as reported in the *Times* of June 29, speaking of the 'multitudinous and difficult affairs' with which he had been incessantly occupied, said that three adjectives described 'the life of an Archbishop of Canterbury at the present time. They were that it was incredible, indefensible, and inevitable.'

It is only when a great English administrator, whether in Church or State, recognizes that the terms incredible, indefensible, inevitable may be rightly applied to the practical discharge of the duties of his great office that we feel that he has a right understanding of the nature of that office and of himself in rela-

[1] Published by Thomas Murby & Co., Fleet Lane, E.C.4. Price 1/- net, cloth 1/6. 1937.

tion to it. English lay statesmen, like Lord Palmerston, Disraeli, Mr. Gladstone and Earl Baldwin, have been more ready to recognize this than have our great ecclesiastics. Clarendon, in his history of the Great Rebellion, complained that 'the clergy were the worst judges of public affairs of any class of educated men in the nation.' The poor judgment of clerics has been due to their failure to recognize that an effectual practical policy demands an infinite number of compromises which, judged by theoretical and idealist standards, are indefensible, and therefore must on no account be put into practice.

Lord Morley, in his essay on Compromise, shewed that he knew better than these clerics, but even he had his limitations, for he only permitted compromise to the rulers of the State, like himself, but not to the rulers of the Church. The Primate's confession indicates that he has transcended the limitation set by Lord Morley, and just because he has done so he finds himself compelled, in the interests of both Church and State, not to be theoretically correct and logically consistent in the discharge of his innumerable duties, but practically effective, having as his objective the highest common measure of public welfare.

Inconsistency is the bugbear of little minds. Consistency can only be achieved in those realms in which philosophers are kings and their subjects are non-existent. But inconsistency and illogicality characterize all great practical policies which seek to combine in fruitful co-operation the *utile* and the *honestum*. While the principles of the Gospel must be lucidly enunciated and unflinchingly maintained as the ultimate ideals of all human striving and true human welfare, the most that can be achieved in public policy is a steady advance in conduct towards their realization.

We are about to experience a many-sided attack on the present relation of the Church to the State in this country. We shall have all sorts of theoretical reasons advanced against that relationship. These reasons will be based upon pleas for consistency and logicality, not upon historical precedent and great practical considerations of national welfare. May we not hope, in that day, that our Primate will point out to our *a priori* theorists that things which are *prima facie* incredible, logically indefensible, are yet practically inevitable.

MODERNISM FOR ORDINANDS.

The Bishop of Derby, Dr. Rawlinson, took the occasion of the annual festival of St. Stephen's House, Oxford, to preach to the students the Gospel of Modernism. As St. Stephen's House is the Oxford Anglo-Catholic theological college, the Bishop cannot be justly charged with carrying coals to Newcastle. He said, as reported in the *Oxford Times* of June 18,

> 'The presentation of the Gospel in terms of traditionally orthodox terminology, or even in terms of the thought forms of the New Testament, does not directly strike home in all cases to the hearts or immediately exhibit itself as being capable of assimilation by the minds of a generation which is unfortunately, to a large extent, out of touch with the Biblical world of ideas. There will be a need of translation work upon the basis of hard study and thought, no less than of prayer. We shall not have to be afraid of being modern.'

The Bishop struck a responsive chord in the heart of his audience when he added, 'Of course the process is dangerous.' The reasons for this are that the effective translation of the Gospel into modern terms demands two qualifications. First, the Gospel itself must be adequately grasped by the translator, and, secondly, what is expressed in the new terms must be really the Gospel and not something else. These two conditions the Bishop feared had not been fulfilled in the case of 'not a few modernisms.' But the risks had to be taken. The Bishop concluded by saying :

> 'It was to the men of their own time that they were to find ways of proclaiming the Gospel, and they must proclaim it in ways that appealed to and made contact with the thoughts in their minds, no less than with the needs which were urgent within their hearts. There could be no patent recipe in these matters.'

When the need for Modernism is recognized by those in authority in the Church, and when freedom and encouragement are given to the younger clergy to be modernist in their teaching, the right kind of Modernism is bound, as the result of practical experiment, to assert itself over its less competent rivals. John Milton asked only one thing for the truth : Give her but room. When it is recognized, as it is being recognized today by an increasing number of our bishops, that Modernism is not heresy but a new and more effective form of Christian apologetic, not only will the fear of Modernism disappear from Church circles, but the whole Church will steadily become Modernist without recognizing the fact.

THE UNITY OF TRUTH*

By the Rev. J. S. Boys Smith, M.A., Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge.

'Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.'
—*John* viii, 32.

'IT was no new thing,' wrote Fenton John Anthony Hort of the early stages of the Christian movement, 'to desire and pursue and find truth. It was no new thing to aim at the service of God as the highest end of action. But it was an altogether new thing to learn that the knowledge of truth is indispensable for the mature service of God, and that the desire and pursuit of truth is an essential part of holy worship.'[1] The mature service of God is not on this account confined to the study or the laboratory, though assuredly it is found in them; for the pursuit of truth is not limited to theoretical enquiry. Truth is pursued in some manner and form wherever there is real sincerity of feeling, directness of apprehension, or honesty of purpose; and, where these are lacking, the pursuit of truth itself is more or less forsaken, whether our special preoccupation be with theory or with practice. But to combine these two aims, the pursuit of truth and the service of God, and to learn that there is no mature service of God where they fall asunder, is the most difficult of lessons to learn and the hardest of practical tasks to perform. And perhaps to attain this goal completely would involve a synthesis, in thought and in action, which lies partly beyond our reach. As Hort wrote of those who are impelled to seek the truth for themselves, 'There is not and indeed cannot be any security that they will emerge on the Christian side: in human minds that truth does not always win the present victory, even when it is faithfully pursued.' Yet, if the synthesis is possible at all, we must also add with him that 'whatever be the present result to themselves or to others through them, it is not possible that they or that any should fall out of the keeping of Him who

*A sermon preached in St. Mary's, Oxford, before the University, on 30 May, 1937, the First Sunday after Trinity.

[1] *The Way the Truth the Life*, p. 43; *cf.* pp. 78 *f.*

appointed the trial: and to the Church any partial loss that may arise is outweighed by the gain from those whose faith has come to rest on a firmer foundation. Truth cannot be said to prevail where it is assented to on irrelevant or insufficient grounds; and the surest way to evoke its power is to encourage the strenuous confronting of it with personal life and knowledge.'[2]

The words which I have quoted are from the Hulsean Lectures which Hort delivered in Cambridge in 1871, and from an Introduction to them written somewhat later. They belong, therefore, to a period when the conflict — partly real and partly apparent — between Christian belief and an expanding knowledge in various fields of enquiry was acutely felt. The latter part of the nineteenth century is to-day often described as a period of complacent belief in the progress of civilization, in the power of knowledge to advance it, and in the certainty of its steady continuance in the future. If it was a century of hope, that is not a good ground on which to condemn it. But it was at the same time a period of change and of discovery, and, especially in religion, of questioning and doubt. Neither those who were prepared to defend the current Christian beliefs in their entirety, nor those who thought that Christian belief had reached its appointed term and could be superseded, have been vindicated by the subsequent course of history. But of course there were others, more far-seeing, who shared neither of these beliefs, but were convinced that a synthesis between religious faith and free investigation was possible, even if they could not see its outcome completely. Among them was Hort himself. There can have been few better qualified to reach and maintain this conviction. He is known best, perhaps, as the accurate scholar, the student of early Christian history and of the text of the New Testament, who published little and wrote himself, in words afterwards printed upon the title-page of the *Life and Letters*, that 'A life devoted to truth is a life of vanities abased and ambitions forsworn.'[3] But he combined, to a degree at that date already quite exceptional, a mastery of his own special field of study with precise knowledge in several other fields and a still wider range of interests. The Hulsean Lectures were philo-

[2] *The Way the Truth the Life*, p. xxxvi.
[3] From *The Way the Truth the Life*, pp. 93*f*.

sophical rather than apologetic or historical, and at the time when he was delivering them he was examining in botany for the Natural Sciences Tripos, and he had already examined more than once in the Moral Sciences. Yet this conviction of the unity of truth was for him primarily a conviction of the spirit which should inspire all enquiry and of the goal towards which it should move : it was not a conviction of actual accomplishment. 'There is a necessary preservation,' he wrote, 'which is simply apologetic : the more powerful preservation comes by perilous use and perilous reform.'[4]

It would, I think, be true to say that this conviction of the unity of truth was typical of the period of Hort's life, though it often manifested itself in forms of which he would certainly not have approved. Even those who were least prepared to surrender a conception of revelation inherited from an earlier day did not doubt that it must somehow be shown to be consistent with discoveries, if such they were admitted to be, in other spheres; and those engaged in these discoveries assumed that their work implied consequences — often perhaps too hastily drawn — for religious belief. This partly accounts for the prevailing uneasiness, and for the sharpness of the conflict, as it seemed, between religious faith and scientific knowledge. The unity of truth was generally admitted : belief in it underlies both the Scientific Naturalism of the time and the widely different Idealistic philosophy of the same or a somewhat later period.

The unity of truth, and specially the ultimate consistency of religious truth and truth in other spheres, has seldom, I suppose, been explicity denied ; though of course it has been held that the apprehension of this unity lies, or even must necessarily lie, beyond the reach of the human mind. But to-day this conviction of the unity of truth, which inspired Hort, and in the Lectures from which I have quoted found an expression which will not soon grow old, does not, I think, make the same appeal or afford an equal inspiration. The reasons are partly discernible ; though, as is true of all important changes in outlook, they lie too deeply hidden and are too complex to be wholly intelligible. It would not be true to say that we no longer believe in knowledge or in its power. The effort expended in its pursuit and accumulation,

[4] *The Way the Truth the Life*, p. 178.

the importance ascribed to education, and the ever-growing need of knowledge for material well-being, are evidence to the contrary. Perhaps its very growth is a partial explanation; for the narrow fields within which it is often pursued, and apparently must be pursued to be attained effectually, make its unity less easy to grasp and discourage the effort to grasp it. Whether inevitable or not, this is certainly a loss; for the specialized knowledge of many minds, even when gained by co-operative effort, is for no mind a knowledge of the whole. A great deal, no doubt, can be set down to the political and social upheaval of the war, and to a loss of faith in human civilization. But the tendency of which I am speaking is not entirely due to this upheaval; for it was visible before the era of peace had ended.[5] Moreover, a hundred years ago there arose, after a longer period of war and amidst greater poverty and material distress, an exalted sense of human possibilities and an almost unlimited faith in the power of the human mind. This optimism, characteristic of philosophy in Germany at that time and of some of our own greatest poetry, was not shallow, but arose from the conviction that the mind and its order were stronger than evil and decay. Very important, I think, has been the consciousness, stronger now perhaps than ever before, that knowledge, if it is the greatest power for progress, can be turned also into the most powerful instrument of evil and destruction.

Whatever the causes may be, crisis and paradox have a greater attraction to-day for many minds than continuity and understanding; and this is especially true in the sphere of religious thought. The desire for them follows the increase of scepticism, in the form of disillusionment, of loss of faith in knowledge and of courage in action. Scepticism of this sort desires certainty above all things, and sets it above the demands of truth, which require us to doubt what is doubtful no less than to believe what is assured.

This tendency may take more than one form. It may take the form, which I think is not uncommon at the present time, of separating our thinking, and perhaps even our acting, from our

[5] Illustrations might be found in the rise of Pragmatism, in the movement of Roman Catholic Modernism and the reaction against 'Liberalism' in theology, and in the influence of the important discovery of the 'eschatological' hopes in the Gospels and in early Christianity.

religious emotion, which is preserved in a world apart. Religion, in this form, is treasured and may be practised regularly; but it has become a special interest, neither justified by what we know from other sources, nor able to spread its own influence upon them. It would be wrong, I am sure, to despise such piety, or those who feel driven to seek in it a sustenance which they cannot find elsewhere. But it goes with the sceptical temper, so different from that rational scepticism which attempts to doubt preconceptions because determined to rest on nothing that is not the truth. A religion which has not, in some form, felt a passion for the truth, even it may be at the cost of all present certainty, is not fully worthy of its name; and it all too easily allies itself with superstition or with tyranny which are the foes of all real knowledge of truth. Some sense of this demand, as I have said, is involved in all real sincerity of feeling and in all honesty of purpose. A religion of the kind I have described easily loses association with goodness, and may lose even its sincerity of feeling.

The powerful movement now active in Protestant thought on the Continent offers a very different conception of religion; but in it, too, belief in the unity of truth is sacrificed. Man's nature is totally corrupt, incapable of knowledge of God, except as man wholly submits himself to a Divine Word, which speaks neither to his reason nor through the world of men and nature, but through a unique and overwhelming revelation, once for all. There is no unity between truth, as it is sought in science or philosophy, and this Word of God. The Divine Word is necessarily paradox; it operates as crisis, not as enlightenment. The divorce between what man discovers and what God reveals is, indeed, so complete that man's discovery, genuine within its limited range, cannot reach, and does not even support, the wholly other truth of revelation, through which alone man can find redemption.

But if man's reason—which must surely mean all his powers of apprehension — is totally corrupt, there is no answer to the question how he can receive the Word of God; and if there is no unity between the truth he discovers and the truth imparted to him, how can the revelation really effect his redemption and teach him that, for all his blindness, he lives still in God's world?

The true criticism of this teaching is not, I think, that it preaches Christianity as a gospel of man's redemption. It is quite right in its contention that error is not merely limited truth, and that evil is something other than defective goodness; and that both of them are real. And there is a sense, of fundamental importance, in which religious faith is victory over the world, and not merely either flight from it or acceptance of it. But there can be no victory over the world except as we find its true meaning and learn its right use; and all genuine truth about the world itself must have some relevance, whether we can always trace it or not, to this meaning we are set in the world to learn. And provided we remember that to grow in the knowledge of the truth means to correct error and to suppress evil, and not merely to expand our information, we shall not think that the revelation we call Christian is exalted or made more profound by being set in isolation from all other truth. If it corrects or deposes what was taken for truth, it is itself enlarged as it is understood in a larger world. The claim which the Christian revelation makes upon us is not ultimately of a different kind from that which is made upon us by any sort of truth accepted with integrity of mind. This integrity of mind is the absolute condition of the real acceptance of any truth at all. We shall then draw no ultimate boundaries within the sphere of truth, nor, if we believe in God, deny that it comes to us at once of His revelation and as the meaning of the one environment in which we live. Until what we know of God is known as the meaning of, as what gives meaning to, the world and ourselves, it can have no real importance for our redemption or for our victory over the world; and all that we know of the world itself must, if it is rightly known, contribute something towards this meaning. It seems to me, therefore, that the aim of a natural theology, though rejected by the teaching I have referred to, must be an important and a legitimate aim for any really important thought on these problems; and that we can set no ultimate boundary between its methods and conclusions and those of a theology called revealed. This unity is demanded by the needs of a full religion no less than by those of theoretical understanding. And if, failing to recognize that all apprehended truth comes to us with a claim upon our acceptance and integrity, we relegate

some of it to a merely 'natural' sphere and deny that it too has the character of revelation, of the real world really disclosing itself to our minds, we are unfaithful, it seems to me, to that requirement of integrity, whether it be of feeling or willing or thinking, which is the precondition of all knowledge, whether of God or of the world.

I am far from wishing to assert that we can everywhere see fully the unity of all the various meanings the world seems to have for us. But it is sometimes said that the attitudes of religious faith and of unfettered enquiry are different in a sense which makes it necessary that we should choose between them, or at least that in our own practice we should deliberately alternate between them. If we really had to choose, not every one perhaps would choose alike; and I do not see how we could set one choice as unconditionally higher than the other. But I do not think they are rightly distinguished when they are thus contrasted, or even when it is said that we must alternate between them. It is no doubt difficult to say completely how it is that we accept, or are justified in accepting, a religious conviction; but, if we are justified at all, it must be because we are accepting it upon some sort of *evidence*, though it may be evidence which, to be seen, requires in ourselves both feeling and willing in addition to what we are accustomed to distinguish as purely intellectual apprehension; and the same, I think, is true in the end of the apprehension of any evidence whatever. Where there is no interest and no seeking, there is no seeing or knowing at all. But the point on which I would lay stress is that where we have religious faith we are not accepting, once and for all, some *datum*, possessing which we can then turn round and seek to understand the world. We accept it rightly only when it wins, and continues to claim, our reverence and our conviction; and we are not absolved from continuing to confront it with all the further knowledge and evidence that lies at our command. If it remains a mystery, something seen through a glass darkly, that is not because we have dared not confront it with the light, but because it is evidence to us of a depth of further meaning, of further possibilities, beyond all that we have so far been able to grasp. If faith goes against appearances, as it does, that is because it has some evidence that the appearances are not all the

truth. To quote again from the words of Hort, 'They who follow the Spirit's guidance will not receive an illumination enabling them to dispense with truth, but the enablement to lay hold of truth: the voice of the Spirit will be heard only in the interpretation of truth, and specially of the Truth.'[6] And an attitude essentially similar is required, I think, by all enquiry. If we like, we may call this faith also, the faith that reality will not deceive us if we learn to ask it the right questions and to receive its answers with that sincerity, that openness of mind, which is the condition of all knowledge. In neither case are we stepping merely into the darkness or the wholly unknown; we are enlarging and further interpreting some meaning we have already seen; and were it not for this we could never really move forward at all, nor should we even feel the need to do so.

If this is true, we shall not set faith and knowledge, awareness of God and comprehension of the world, in opposition; we shall not think that we have to choose, or merely to alternate, between religious faith and unfettered enquiry. The interests may be partly different, and their satisfactions partly different too. But for both we shall need all the truth we can attain; and in each case we must resolve to rest with nothing less. As an old writer, John Smith, the Platonist, wrote of 'The true Way or Method of attaining to Divine Knowledge': 'He that will finde Truth, must seek it with a *free judgment*, and a *sanctified minde*: he that thus seeks, shall finde; he shall live in Truth, and that shall live in him; it shall be like a stream of living waters issuing out of his own Soule; he shall drink of the waters of his own cisterne, and be satisfied; he shall every morning finde this Heavenly *Manna* lying upon the top of his own Soule, and be fed with it to eternal life; he will finde satisfaction within, feeling himself in conjunction with Truth, though all the World should dispute against him.'[7]

[6] *The Way the Truth the Life*, p. 58.

[7] *Select Discourses*, 1660, pp. 12*f*.

THE INTERPRETATION OF JESUS IN THE CREEDS

By G. W. Butterworth, Litt.D.,
Author of *Clement of Alexandria,* etc.

THE Creeds go back to the beginning; for as soon as any word or phrase was used to symbolize the believer's thought about Jesus, the process of credal formation had begun. It depends upon the fact that Jesus made an unusual impression upon a few of His contemporaries, who believed Him to be something extraordinary, an outstanding visitor to this world. We call such men geniuses, poets, artists, and the like. The Jews had no such categories, and even if they had, Jesus would not have fitted into any one of them. Their categories were prophet, Son of God, Messiah. The common people regarded Jesus as a prophet, perhaps one of the old prophets returned to earth. The disciples of Jesus went farther, and regarded Him as the Son of God. There was nothing metaphysical about this title; it denoted a close moral affinity between a man and the divine Father from whom he sprang and in whose image, according to Jewish belief, he was formed. The title came from the experience of Jesus at His baptism, when He heard a voice that said, 'Thou art my Son; in thee I am well pleased.' This crisis decisive for Jesus, giving Him authority to act as the Son of God.

The title, Son of God, did not at first signify the full Messianic status of Jesus; if it had done so, there would have been no reason for the next step in interpretation. At Caesarea Philippi Peter, speaking in the name of the Twelve (for the question must often have been discussed among them, and there is no hint of disagreement), declared Jesus to be the Messiah, the divinely anointed king and vicegerent of God. According to St. Matthew's narrative, Peter's confession marked an intuitive leap to a new conception of Jesus; 'Flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee.' But Jesus had already foreseen that the divine purpose was not an immediate advance of God's people to glory. Rejection of the Messiah must come, and His true

functions would be revealed by a return, after death, from heaven to judge the world and establish an everlasting kingdom. How much of this was Jesus' own belief, and how much the thought of the time which He could not correct, we need not decide. Certainly the disciples' ideas, after the Passion, ran along such lines.

Thus a definite creed, the basis of all future additions, was already in existence when the Church began. The Ethiopian eunuch, challenged by Philip to express his belief, said: 'I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God.' This statement, though not part of the original text of *Acts*, was inserted there early, before baptism in the Three-fold Name had become customary. The two ideas, of Divine Sonship and Messiahship, are here conflated; for when the term Messiah was translated into Greek as 'the Christ' it soon lost its article and was regarded as a proper name, Christ. This name was placed by the side of Jesus, and the words Son of God added as an explanation.

In the Greek world a further development at once took place. Men had become used to satisfying their religious needs by enrolling themselves under the protection of some deity, whom they addressed as 'lord.' It was in consequence easy, and indeed inevitable, that Greek Christians should regard Jesus as their 'lord.' St. Paul insists that the Lord Christ must not be confused with the 'lords many' whom his converts had once served. Yet Jesus must have occupied in their minds the same kind of position as these deities formerly did. The title 'lord' was considered highly significant by the Church. If a man in ecstatic prayer uttered the words 'Jesus is Lord,' it was proof that he was inspired by the Holy Spirit and not by some false spirit. Finally, in the name of Jesus—that is, in this name Lord, which Jesus had acquired through His humiliation and return to glory—every knee will at last bow, of beings in heaven, on earth and in the underworld; and every tongue will confess that Jesus is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.

Thus in the Pauline Epistles, within the decade 50 to 60 A.D., we find the foundation clause of the creeds, Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord, completely framed. By these words Christians confessed their belief in One who was originally in heaven with God the Father. There was within His grasp an 'equality with

God,' of the kind which a son can enjoy with his father, based upon similarity of nature and constant intercommunion. The difference was that the Father was primary, the Son derivative. This derivation was expressed in the term 'begotten.' The Son's relationship with other beings was expressed by the term 'first-born of all creation,' or 'of every created being.' This meant, first, that the Son existed when no other created beings existed; and, secondly, that He was the agent in creation, all things being made through Him.

It is unlikely that St. Paul and the author of the *Epistle to the Hebrews*, through whose writings these basic elements of the creed have come down to us, asked whether the Son was co-eternal with the Father or not. He was a Mediator, a middle person between God and man, both in creation and redemption. Thought was fixed on His work in the present and the future, rather than His status in the past. Now if a Jew wished to envisage a glorious Being, the first creation of God, sitting at God's right hand and reigning over the universe, he could do so without misgiving. Many Jews, especially those living outside Palestine, felt that God was so transcendent that He could only touch the world through an intermediary. Philo, the Alexandrian Jewish expositor of the Old Testament, had elaborated a doctrine of the Word, a kind of second God, together with other inferior powers hovering between heaven and earth. St. Paul, too, held the theory of eight revolving spheres above the earth, each peopled with its appropriate spirits. This theory almost inevitably involved the localization of God, for it placed Him in an ethereal region beyond the stars. He could only help the world, therefore, by a Mediator, but the question had not yet arisen whether this Mediator must be one eternally and essentially joined to Him, or simply the crown of created beings.

This explains why, at a later age, both Arians and Athanasians appealed to St. Paul and *Hebrews* for support. Athanasius, in his *Second Discourse against the Arians*, spends much time trying to prove that the phrase 'firstborn of every creation' indicates one who was essentially different from the creation and not merely prior to it. The Arians, he complains, went about saying: 'If he is the firstborn of every creation, it is plain that he himself is one of the creations.' Yet, after all, this is the

natural meaning of the words. The Arians were wrong, not in this interpretation, but in failing to realize that after two and a half centuries some qualification of St. Paul's language, used in moments of prophetic inspiration before theological reflection had had time to operate, was necessary.

To return therefore. By the close of the first century Christians had their creed about Jesus clothed in definite words: 'We believe in Jesus Christ, his only Son our Lord.' To this was added a recital of the salient facts about the appearance of the Son of God on earth, all of which are to be found succinctly expressed in the New Testament, with indications that they were put together in larger or smaller combinations in different localities to serve for the instruction of candidates for baptism. One such 'pattern of sound words' is mentioned in the *Second Epistle to Timothy* (i, 13). Of the facts recited in these incipient creeds the Virgin Birth marks Jesus off from all other men; the Crucifixion is the climax of His redemptive work; the Resurrection and Ascension describe His triumph; the return to judge the world marks the Christian's hope. Nothing is said about the ordinary human life of Jesus. If we had the creeds, and nothing else, to go by, there might be danger of confusing the person they referred to with legendary figures such as Mithras or Osiris, except for the name of the Mother of Jesus and the touch of history in the words 'under Pontius Pilate.' Neither the moral character of Jesus nor the love of God is mentioned; although, of course, Christians took it for granted that the latter was the foundation of their faith. But, clearly, the main current of interest was directed towards the divine Being, Christ the Son of God; and His precise relationship with the Jesus who had lived on earth was not yet thought out.

Here I would suggest that the framers of the creeds, and the writers of the Gospels, were different classes of men, having different interests. Creed-makers were the official element, the men who baptized and celebrated the Eucharist. Gospel writers, on the other hand, who strove to record what had actually happened in the life of Jesus, were probably lay people, in whom the human and historical interest was predominant. Doubtless, as Form critics maintain, the records were often preserved on account of their apologetic value. But this cannot apply to all,

or even nearly all, the gospel stories. Much of the teaching of Jesus was unconnected with controversy, and that part which had apologetic value in Palestine would have lost it when the Church moved into the Gentile world. Here the Old Testament became the chief defence of Christianity, and its pages were searched for texts which predicted the facts of the life of Jesus. It was in the early stages of this expanding life that the Gospels were written, mainly for Gentile readers. Their authors were probably all Jews, excepting Luke, who by temperament and experience had close Jewish associations. They all accepted the doctrine of the creeds and often allowed it unwittingly to colour their narratives. But no reader can fail to appreciate their strong human interest. They describe scenes (such, for instance, as the controversies of Jesus with the Pharisees) which had no theological interest at all, but belonged to a forgotten past when they wrote. They reproduced, with childlike candour, facts which, to critical minds, would have suggested difficulties in regard to the faith. Even the Fourth Gospel is not devoid of this characteristic, in spite of its strong theological colouring. It was only the witness of these little books which kept the divine Christ from reducing Jesus to a phantom, one who lived the life of a marionette on this earthly stage, without the needs and feelings of common men.

It was the divine Christ, therefore, who was the main object of interest to creed-makers, and when thought was directed to problems raised by the faith of Christians, it began invariably to operate from the divine side. Scarcely anyone in those days held the theory of a purely human Christ. The great controversy which produced the Nicene Creed was not concerned to interpret the life of the man Jesus, but to discover the relationship between the pre-existent Christ and God the Father. For us, whether we like it or no, the first problem is the human manifestation. In what manner, or to what degree, does Jesus stand towards us in the place of God? In the early Christian centuries neither orthodox nor heretics had begun to think in this way. For them Jesus Christ was, admittedly, the Word made flesh; the question arose, 'What kind of a Being is this Word, or Son?'

The Word of God was the power which came forth from the inaccessible Deity and formed the medium between Him and

the world. To the ancients, who did not have our clear conception of personality, it was easy to use the term Word as the equivalent of Reason, Life, Light, Righteousness, and so on, at one moment making it, as we should say, personal and at another impersonal. So far as the Word is impersonal, it is obviously coeternal with God, of whom it is little more than an attribute. But in so far as it becomes personal, acquiring an identity of its own, it is more difficult to conceive of its, or rather his, coeternity with God. The Latins have never been disturbed by this difficulty. In their phrase *una substantia, tres personae*, one essence, three—not persons, but—rôles or parts played, the unity of God is stressed and the separate identity of the persons diminished. In spite of the danger of Sabellianism, this phrase appeared practically satisfactory, and the Latins were content to leave it at that. The Greeks, partly on account of their critical mentality, and partly because they inherited more directly than did the Latins the Pauline conception of a glorious Christ dwelling in the heavens, were inevitably drawn to view the problem from the other standpoint. Whatever else was true, Christ was a real Being. Consequently their solution was to regard Christ, and after Him the Holy Spirit, as Beings subordinate to the Father, who was the only unoriginate Being. The question concerning Christ was: What kind of origination, and what degree of subordination, should be attributed to Him?

Origen answered the first question by his doctrine of the 'eternal generation' of the Word. By this any material or merely human associations were excluded, and the terms Son and Word could be used as equivalents. The Son was begotten by the Father by an eternal act of will. But this, while removing one difficulty, introduced another: How did the Father's will act in such a matter? Origen insists on the absolute priority of the Father; the Son is subordinate, not simply in His human nature, but in His own proper being. Origen expressed this subordination in a number of ways. Everything in Christ has a secondary character; He was not even good absolutely, but an image of God's goodness, so that in the Scriptures He is not called good, but the Good Shepherd, or some other title. He is definitely lower than the Father, and Origen, following Philo, does not hesitate to describe Him as a kind of second God. Sometimes he

even calls the Son a created Being, so insistently did his thought demand that the Father should be the author of the Son's existence. Origen did not mean that the Son was not divine. He was eternally created by the Father, and partook to the full of the divine essence. He was, with the Holy Spirit, whom also Origen regarded as a created Being, definitely within the Godhead, while the highest angelic beings were definitely outside it. Origen had been taught that the two cherubim who, in Isaiah's vision, covered the face of God, were the Son and the Spirit. His doctrine and terminology were therefore not new, but traditional at Alexandria. The opposition they encountered later was largely due to the unfortunate twist given to them by Arius.

What Origen did was to take the Christian tradition, as he knew it, and as he found its basis in the Epistles, that Christ was a real Being and not an aspect or attribute of God. To this was joined the conviction, also part of the tradition, that Christ was God and could be worshipped. Then how explain the primacy of the Father, and the order of Son and Spirit? This problem, which many subsequent theologians did not feel to be a problem at all, and which certainly the Latin idea of the Trinity could not solve, accounts for Origen's language. Like his theological predecessors, he is not concerned with the humanity of Jesus. In the beginning of the *First Principles* he says:

> 'In Christ there is one nature, his deity, because he is the only-begotten Son of the Father, and another, a human nature, which in very recent times he took upon him to fulfil the divine purpose.'

After this preface, however, the human nature is quietly dropped, no allusion whatever being made to it. It is of course taken for granted that Jesus had a human nature, but no real significance attaches to it, nor is it used in building up the Church's interpretation of Jesus. In the formulation of theological statements, the divine Christ fills the whole picture. That is not to say that the Gospel stories had no effect; doubtless they were then, as now, the chief support of faith. But the teaching element in the Church shrank from relying upon them, feeling safer when moving in realms remote from this world. It was only when the Docetist bluntly asserted the logical conclusion of the accepted theology that the Church awoke with a protest, like a combatant threatened in a vital part.

Less than a generation after Origen's death, Arius was preaching at Alexandria that Christ was not the Son of God in an eternal sense. Arius was not a deep thinker. But he was trying, undoubtedly, to maintain the Greek tradition of a descent of created life from the Father through intermediate beings to this world. Origen had tried to picture this in a way that harmonized with the essential Christian idea. Even if his picture were faulty, or his method entirely illegitimate, there were with him many safeguards, both intellectual and devotional, which were sufficient to protect the idea from contamination. With Arius it was different; logical argument threatened to exclude religious interests. A Son, he said, cannot be co-existent with a Father. So he coined the phrase, 'There was when he was not,' refusing to employ the word time, but cutting the Son off from the Father's essential life. If it had been simply an abstract discussion of the nature of the Godhead, not much would have been at stake. But, slight as was the attention paid to the human Jesus in this controversy, it was nevertheless felt that His work as man and for man was in peril. Athanasius had a clear view on this point; and his enthusiasm and religious emotion rather than any superior speculative ability gave his cause the victory.

The controversy itself is so far removed from our ways of thinking that it is hard to be interested in its details. The Greek notion of Deity was that of a first principle infinitely removed from the world. Doubtless simple folk believed that in God we live and move and have our being, but immanental thought was not taken very seriously by the wise. Between God and the world came the Fall, with the consequent badness of everything material. Men felt, as they still often do, that the world was so bad that God would be ashamed to own it, and that we must somehow relieve Him of responsibility for it by putting its imperfections down to ourselves, to our forefathers, or to matter. Into such a mental environment came Christianity, proclaiming that God had on one unmistakable occasion entered into the world and brought to man the divine life. This life, in Christian experience, came through Jesus Christ. But if men once felt that Jesus Christ was not really the bearer of such a life, inasmuch as He was not truly one with God, then the Christian hope would grow cold.

So when the three hundred and eighteen Fathers met at Nicaea in 325 A.D. they adopted a creed from Eusebius of Caesarea with a few, but significant, alterations. The scriptural phrase 'first-born of every creation,' which had been the keynote of Christian thought from the days of St. Paul, was deleted, and the non-scriptural term *homoousios* inserted. The unanimity of the Council was more apparent than real, for many of the bishops did not fully understand the points at issue. There were violent reactions and wearisome controversies before the matter was finally settled; but the Church in the long run retained *homoousios*, and doubtless she was right. Yet the decision constituted a breach with the traditional thought of Eastern Christendom. For the very term *homoousios* had been condemned at the Council of Antioch in 270 A.D. because it seemed to minimise the distinction of persons within the Godhead.

The way was now clear for an attempt to deal with the problem of the human Jesus. Christians of the fourth and fifth centuries were not, however, capable of solving it; for the requisite materials could only be supplied by a frank examination of the Gospel narratives, which was then impossible. The presence of miracles in the Gospels lends colour to the idea that Jesus is a mysterious superman, possessing a different nature from our own. The simplest way of describing this is to suppose that the Word or Son took the place of the mind or spirit in the person of Jesus. This would account for His perfection, His miraculous power, and the Church's faith. Apollinarianism has been, and still is, the practical creed of multitudes of unreflecting Christians. It sees Jesus acting like a man, but believes that He has the omnipotence and omniscience of God behind Him. He may set this aside for the most part, but it is there to be called upon in case of need. In the moral sphere it is perpetually active, rendering Jesus *atreptos*, unable to be moved to sin. One of the charges against Arius was that he regarded Jesus as being capable of sin, although in fact He did not sin. Apollinarianism also avoided the difficulty of a double personality in Jesus; for by taking away the human spirit from the nature which Christ assumed, it took away the human personality as well. Nevertheless the Church wisely refused this simplification, feeling that the human nature of Jesus must be left intact. In the quaint

language of the times, it was affirmed that if the Word did not assume the human mind, then the human mind is not redeemed, for that which is not taken is not healed.

Nestorius and Eutyches fared no better. The former, obsessed with the idea that God could only be expressed by majesty and power, refused to believe that he could become incarnate in a tiny child. On his own premises he was right. If you look for a superman, or a celestial being who has descended to earth, he must be grown up. Primitive men have always refused to allow their divine king to be either too young or too old. But the Church as a whole, governed unconsciously by a different idea, namely, that God is revealed in potentiality rather than in present actuality, decided that Jesus must always be the same, from birth to the Cross. God's revelation is made through a continuous human life and not through selected episodes in it. Eutyches, expressing the beliefs of many Eastern Christians, would have disregarded the humanity of Jesus altogether. If Jesus was God, what need was there for Him to be anything else? An extravagance of devotion blinds the worshipper's eyes to the human facts.

The Council of Chalcedon, 451 A.D., did not solve the problem. It said that Christ was One Person with two natures, one human and the other divine. But when we try to think what this means our minds become confused; because, however theologians strive to disguise the fact, it is impossible to think of human nature apart from a human personality. Nevertheless, Chalcedon did definitely assert that Christ possessed a perfect human nature, and by so doing it left the way open for the Church to fashion, upon the basis of Jesus the man, a theology which would be satisfactory to the human mind and heart. One may doubt how far the bishops at Chalcedon could see what was involved in their decision. For they relied largely upon the Tome of Leo; and perhaps their delight in securing the acquiescence of the august pontiff of the West may have led them to overlook certain crudities in Leo's letter. Let me quote two of them, which are representative of the author's thought:

> 'Each nature does the acts that are appropriate to it, in communion with the other; the Word performing what belongs to the Word, the body effecting what belongs to the body. The first of these shines out in miracles; the other submits to injuries.'

And again :

> ' To hunger, to thirst, to be weary and to sleep are evidently human. But to satisfy five thousand men with five loaves ; to give the woman of Samaria living water, on drawing which she would never thirst again ; and to walk on the surface of the sea without immersing his feet, and by rebuking the storm to lull the swelling waves to rest — this unquestionably belongs to God.'

Here the divine nature is frankly equated with the miraculous. Jesus has two sources of action at command, and, although never wholly bereft of either, yet He operates through one when He needs superhuman power and through the other when He resigns Himself to human infirmity. No word about His goodness, or that unerring insight which has enabled Him to revolutionize men's ideas on morality, worship and the character of God ! Are these qualities, then, human or divine? To us it is no problem at all that Jesus should sleep, or hunger, or even be crucified. In regard to such matters He is, thank God, exactly like the rest of us. Nor is it a problem that He should be said to have fed five thousand men with five loaves. For no modern theologian builds upon such narratives as this. As poetical symbols they are used and valued, but for scientific theology they are simply disregarded. We must dig deeper, and penetrate to the moral and spiritual characteristics of Jesus, if we desire to express His significance for man and the universe.

So far from its being the last word in the interpretation of Jesus, the Chalcedonian doctrine signifies the exhaustion of Greek Christian thought. The Greek theologians, passing by the Jesus of the Gospels, took a false track, pursued it as far as it would lead them, and then wisely stopped. The divine inspiration is evident more in what they refrained from doing than in what they did. Their most valuable work for us is their veneration and safe preservation of the New Testament, and above all of the Gospels. In these we possess a well of inspiration, originating in days when Jesus was still remembered as a man among men. They are our surest basis for building up a theology to express the faith that ' God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself.' When the Church seriously tackles the problem from this end, it will be a sign that she has ceased being content merely to preserve, but has returned to her original mission of being a vital and creative force in human life and thought.

'HOW FIELDS WERE WON'

By the Editor.

'SILENCE is golden,' yet not always so. The judicious Hooker wrote that he would not basely, through silence, allow things to pass away as in a dream. 'There is a time to speak,' as the Wise Man wrote. Moved by such considerations, one who for thirty years has been closely associated with the policy of the Modern Churchmen's Union feels constrained to explain that policy to many present-day members of the Union who do not seem to understand it and so are inclined to substitute another policy for it. By policy we mean, in this connection, not the aims of the M.C.U. but its methods of propaganda. That policy may be described as one of *Decentralization and free co-operation*. But to-day there is a tendency to substitute for it a policy of *Centralization and Control*.

Decentralization and free co-operation is, we believe, a type of policy truly congenial to men and women of liberal minds and independent ways such as constitute for the most part the membership of the M.C.U. Such a policy possesses the notes of spaciousness and freedom, personal initiative and co-operative effort; loyalty, but without restriction and subjection.

The policy of *Centralization and Control*, which opposes it, is essentially bureaucratic in temper and method. Its besetting sins are lust for power and uniformity. The weakness of the bureaucrat is that he is always imbued with the feeling that his bureaucratic machine is of more importance than the work it has to do. It seeks to concentrate all authority and all initiative in the hands of a small group. Such a centralized organization will be so concerned with the business of control and administration that it will neither initiate nor look with favour upon new enterprises when created outside its circle and carried on without reliance upon its help and without subjection to its authority. Such undertakings will appear to the centralized authority to be anomalous. Moreover the strength of the central organization, which should be devoted to advancing the cause for which the society exists, will be mainly directed to securing control in

spheres where such control will not only be unhelpful but even detrimental.

When nearly forty years ago the Modern Churchmen's Union (or the Churchmen's Union, as it was then called) was created, its immediate concern was not with the organization and administration of its own society but with the work which it had to accomplish for Church and nation. This was the right attitude and spirit. Organization in a vital and progressive society must ever be subordinate to that society's aims, and is only of use in so far as it promotes those aims effectively.

In those far-off days of our society, it was obvious to all that the primary need of the society was to have an organ in the Press, not only for the purpose of securing publicity for its ideals, but also to provide a meeting ground for all who were interested in its undertakings. Several attempts were made to secure such an organ, but they ended in failure. In 1911, when the society was losing membership, the *Modern Churchman* came into existence. It came into existence outside the society, not in the sense that it did not share that society's ideals, for it was indeed the product of them, but in the sense that the magazine was entirely independent of the society, which had no control over its editorship and administration save that which comes from advice and criticism. The proprietor and editor of the magazine was sensitive to both the advice and criticism of leading members of the society. Although not subject to the control of the society, yet if the magazine was to do its work effectively it needed two things from the society. First, that it should circulate among all the members of the society, with of course perfect freedom to circulate also outside the society, but also that it should have the weight of the society behind it as representing the ideas of the society and as being the normal organ of its expression. Unable in the circumstances to do its own editing, the M.C.U. had to trust instead to the good sense of the Editor and to his loyalty. On the whole, this policy and method has succeeded where any other would have failed. The policy and method, it should be noticed, was one of *Decentralization and free co-operation.*

In 1914, some three years after the founding of the *Modern Churchman*, it seemed to certain members of the M.C.U. that the

holding of an Annual Conference, at which definite theological and ecclesiastical themes and problems should be competently, responsibly and reverently investigated and discussed by the representatives of liberal Christian scholarship, would prove to be of real service to the cause, particularly if the publication and circulation of these papers could also be secured. Accordingly, a small group of scholars organized the first Modern Churchmen's Conference, which was held at Ripon in 1914, shortly before the outbreak of the Great War. This first Conference was greatly appreciated, and the small group of men and women who had organized the first Conference proceeded to do so year by year. The conferences were not only appreciated highly by those who attended them, but the publication of the Conference papers procured an attention for Modernist ideals, and the application of the results of modern Biblical and religious knowledge to practical Church problems, which extended far beyond the range of the membership of the Modern Churchmen's Union. For instance, seven thousand copies of the conference number of the *Modern Churchman* containing the papers read at the notable Girton Conference dealing with Christology were sold, although those who attended the Conference did not exceed three hundred and the members of the society at that time were under a thousand. The popular press reports were read by millions the whole world over.

As illustrating the value of having conferences independent of the control of the central M.C.U. authority, it should be pointed out that in connection with the 1921 Christological Conference, the President of the Union, the Chairman of the Council, the Hon. Sec. of the Union and other members of the Council opposed the holding of a Conference dealing with Christology and tried to compel the Conference Committee to abandon the subject they had selected. This the Conference Committee refused to do, and it was generally admitted afterwards that their judgment was entirely justified.

Although the Modern Churchmen's Annual Conferences are not under the control of the Council of the M.C.U., the organizers of those Conferences have sought to keep the Conferences in close touch with the Council and the Union. In this case an interesting technique has been evolved which deserves attention.

The Conference Committee, at the conclusion of the Annual Conference, selects the new committee which is to arrange for, and carry out, the next Conference. At the first M.C.U. Council meeting which follows the Conference, the Chairman of the Conference Committee presents a report of the Conference to the Council and requests the Council to elect the committee already nominated. The Council has no power either to add to this committee or to take from it. It has, however, the power to refuse to appoint it if it be dissatisfied with the way in which the preceding conference has been carried out. The Council has never refused such election, and has invariably expressed grateful approbation of the Conferences. In this sphere of endeavour the policy of *Decentralization and free co-operation* has proved its worth.

In 1917 a group of Modern Churchmen were convinced that the cause could be advanced by the publication of a series of

> 'clear, short, truthful books dealing with the Christian Religion from the standpoint of those who, while accepting the main results of modern scientific, historical, and literary research, are also believers in the Christian Religion and working members of the Church of England.'

They subscribed £10 apiece, appointed one of their number as editor, who in his turn was fortunate enough to secure Mr. John Murray as publisher. The first volume of the series, *The Faith of a Modern Churchman*, written by Canon Glazebrook, was published in 1918. It attracted wide attention, and its significance was indicated by a full-page review, of a uniformly hostile character, in the *Church Times* of March 15, 1918. Seven volumes had been issued in this series when in 1925 the Editor resigned owing to pressure of other work. Several volumes in this series exercised considerable influence on Church thought, particularly *The Genius of the English Church*, by Alfred Fawkes; *The Evolution of the Christian Ministry*, by J. R. Cohu; and *Causes of the Present Conflict of Ideals in the Church of England*, by R. D. Richardson. This effort again, it should be noted, was an example of *Decentralization and free co-operation.* All who took part in it were loyal to the ideals of the M.C.U. They adopted its name for their library, but they were entirely free from the Union's control.

Other series of volumes, pamphlets and books have been

published by the Council of the M.C.U., the editors being editorially independent but not financially independent of the M.C.U., as in the case of the first series.

In our latest publication, the notable volume *The Church and the Twentieth Century*, edited by the Rev. G. L. H. Harvey, and published by Macmillans, a return was made to the original method of editorial and financial independence, and with notable success.

In 1918, Modern Churchmen engaged on another enterprise. It had long been recognized by a very small group of Modern Churchmen, including Dr. Hastings Rashdall, Canon Glazebrook, Dr. Tollinton and Professor Percy Gardner, that the training of ordinands in theological colleges had a very serious influence upon the prospects of the Modernist movement. Bishop Boyd-Carpenter of Ripon had already recognized in 1898 that there were men who desired to be ordained for whom the existing theological colleges were highly uncongenial. He had therefore founded a small theological college at Ripon of a more liberal type. This had been closed down during the Great War, and shortly before the Armistice the Bishop was taking steps to have it re-opened when Peace should arrive. It was proposed to the Bishop that if his foundation was to secure support and maintenance after his decease it could only be by its obtaining the support of the Modern Churchmen's Union. Difficult and delicate negotiations were opened up, and on his death-bed the Bishop nominated a number of the members of the Council to be Governors of his foundation. He died actually before their election. By their election Modernist support was secured for his foundation and the Modernist character of this theological college guaranteed.

This theological college, henceforth known as Ripon Hall, was opened in Oxford in 1919. The *Church Times* again noted the significance of the enterprise and imparted its blessing in the following paragraph :

> ' It is proposed to remove the Theological College from Ripon and to provide it with buildings in a University town. . . . It is interesting to recall the history of the last attempt to found a Latitudinarian theological college. Promoted by a bishop, and having a learned canon as its principal, it numbered at one time as many as two students. With their ordination the college came to an end.'

The gloomy prognostications of the *Church Times* were not fulfilled, and Ripon Hall has contributed a not inconsiderable number of Modernist clergymen to the ranks of the English ministry—for instance, twenty-five of its students were ordained deacons in fourteen different dioceses in the academic year just concluded—and their effect on that Church and ministry will become more marked as the century proceeds. Again it should be noted that this latest form of Modernist adventure and expansion is an example of the method of *Decentralization and free co-operation.* The Council of the M.C.U. has no direct control over Ripon Hall, yet many of its Council are among the Governors of the Hall, and many of the clergy, trained in the Hall, are among the members of the M.C.U.

The undertaking of this enterprise was accomplished by a very small proportion of the Union, and at the time, had any vote been taken of the Union or of the Council, the proposal would have been rejected. A very notable and influential member of our society in those days, the Hon. Secretary of the M.C.U., concluded his protest against the policy by saying : 'I cannot see what the Union has to do with running a theological college.' Perhaps we may add that there are still many Modern Churchmen who need to be won to support this Modernist enterprise. If we are to achieve our purpose we must very largely achieve it through the clergy, particularly the younger clergy. It is perhaps hard for a society very largely lay in its membership to recognize this.

This article, as is obvious, has been deliberately written for the purpose of protecting and advocating a policy which has secured marked success for the Modernist cause. That policy is one of *Decentralization and free co-operation*—a policy which encourages minorities of stalwarts to initiate new enterprises and to co-operate in their achievement in complete independence of control by the central authority and yet in absolute loyalty to its ideals.

THEOCENTRIC HUMANISM*

By the Rev. G. L. H. Harvey, M.A., Rector and Rural Dean of Sutton Coldfield.

TO think things out, writes Professor de Burgh, 'requires an equipment of knowledge, and, above all, of technique, that must seem irksome to minds bent on a forward outlook, adventurous to make experiments, and athirst with the desire to keep pace with the hurrying movement of a restless age.' The age is one in which systematic theology is impatiently dismissed as 'academic,' an attitude which, though understandable in the young and mentally undisciplined, is less pardonable in those whose years bar the plea of immaturity. Professor de Burgh frankly admires the exuberant vitality of the younger generation, but he is none the less troubled about its mistrust of intellect. 'Experience' usurps the place of reason. There is a general eagerness to be on the move, in whatever direction and at whatever cost. Professors Alexander and Whitehead, he remarks, have got even God on the move. Another present-day prophet, Bergson, has dethroned intelligence in favour of intuition, while D. H. Lawrence seeks to penetrate the mysterious abyss of darkness through immediate emotional experience. 'My great religion,' said Lawrence, 'is a belief in the blood, the flesh, as being wiser than the intellect. We can go wrong in our minds. But what the blood feels, and believes, and says, is always true.' Professor de Burgh would not dispute Lawrence's claim to be the exponent of a religion.

> 'Lawrence was at heart an austere Puritan, and we can well understand his delight in the Letters of the mediaeval prototype of Puritanism, St. Bernard. If it had fallen to the lot of "Jix," as Home Secretary, to pass judgment on St. Bernard's Sermons on the Canticle, he would have censored them, as ignorantly, and on the same pretexts, as he did Lawrence's novels.'

But the intensity of an emotion is no guarantee of its value:

> 'It is fashionable in these latter days for religious writers to idealize the irrational in human nature at the expense of reason and to believe that in stressing the emotional factor in religion they are vindicating

* *Towards a Religious Philosophy*. By Prof. W. G. de Burgh. (Macdonald and Evans; price 10/- net.)

> its independence from scientific and historical criticism. They should beware of the allurement. A religion that severs its faith from intellectual truth may flourish for a generation or even for a century, but is doomed to eventual extinction. . . . *Pectus facit theologum*: yes, but where the heart alone is in evidence, there can be not only no theology, but no true religion.'

Unhappily in the religious world, as elsewhere, reason is at a discount. Anglican and Nonconformist leaders in England are conspicuous rather as administrators than as examples of intellectual enlightenment. Influential theologians of the calibre of Karl Barth and Rudolf Otto declare, in effect, that religious revelation has no message for the human intellect, a position which easily passes into the assertion that religious experience is irrational. Dr. Buchman offers the middle classes a type of religion which neither makes appeal to the reason nor makes any claim on the intelligence. Of the Group Movement, Professor de Burgh says:

> 'Evidence and argument play no part in its activities; their place is filled by direct illumination by the Spirit. It not only lacks intellectual foundation, but glories in the lack of it. For this reason I question whether its influence will last. No religion can endure without a rational basis; and the Group Movement, for all its insistence on a high standard of conduct, is likely to go the way that Mithraism went when confronted with Christianity.'

If Professor de Burgh condemns irrationality in religion, he is no less severe on the tendency displayed in some quarters to deprecate the importance of the historical element. 'The world cannot be redeemed by even the noblest of abstractions.' To confuse history with mythology is, in his opinion, to deny value to religious experience. 'The facts, to prove effective for religion, must be true, and to publish legend as truth involves palpable dishonesty.'

Religion proceeds from an intuition of God which, while revelational in character, is rational as well as emotional. Indeed, all knowledge is revelational, for it is the presupposition of all thinking that truth is found, not made. The artist and the poet know that their achievement is 'what they half create and half perceive.' The philosopher also must needs start with his intuitions. Hence the diversity of metaphysical systems. The divergencies between theological creeds proceeding from diversities of religious intuition are no more striking than, for example, the divergencies between the metaphysical systems of

Signor Croce and Mr. Bertrand Russell. Signor Croce and Mr. Russell use the same logic, if logic be defined as 'the science of the forms of mediate or inferential thinking.' Their divergence goes much deeper than logic. Faith, again, is no more an idiosyncracy of the religious consciousness than is intuition. 'Intellectual research and moral action alike rest on the conviction that the universe is responsive to our speculative and ethical interests.' But religious intuition is not beyond criticism. It calls for dispassionate examination, and here the human intellect must be the judge.

> 'How far finality' (writes Professor de Burgh) 'can be ascribed under these conditions, to any body of propositions couched in human language, is just one of those questions that invite discussion between the theologian and the philosopher. I do not think that such finality is admissible, that either theological dogmas or the primary experience which they define can claim more than relative and partial truth.'

The life and character of religious people is strong evidence for the rationality of the intuition on which they are based :

> 'If we think of those of our own acquaintance whose religious integrity we most respect, we find that their characters bear the stamp of rationality. They display coherence both in the content of their faith and in the life which it inspires. So far from being fanatics, of disordered brain or constitution, they are, for the most part, sober citizens of the world, who order their affairs with wisdom and display an exceptionally clear insight into human nature and into the finer bearings of situations that call for action. . . . Apart from the difficulty of explaining how such experience could have arisen as an illusion, it gives rise to forms of character and conduct that display the distinctive marks of reason.'

Professor de Burgh insists that the great thinkers of the Middle Ages were real humanists in that they allowed a place in their scheme for the complex interests of man. But their humanism was theocentric. The humanism prevalent during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was anthropocentric. The latter 'issues in speculative emptiness and practical disillusionment'; the former 'finds in the vision of the *Civitas Dei* scope for the faith in human dignity and in universal brotherhood.' That vision has now been lost by large multitudes, and its loss accounts for the troubles which beset our age. Truth has gone by the board, and activism has usurped the place of reason. 'The desire of the age is still to act, to be ever restlessly in motion, as science tells us nature is, to beat the record in rapid onrush, like the motorists and the airmen.' This perhaps, adds

Professor de Burgh, is the reason why, compared with the great Victorian reformers, the present generation is ineffective in coping with the the world's evils.

In his preface, Professor de Burgh says that he has touched on the practical problems of the present generation in his closing chapters because he believes that only a religious philosophy can stay the impulse towards unreason. This portion of his book provides a diagnosis of the present position marked by brilliance and insight. He writes throughout, not primarily for academic philosophers, but for the larger public interested in philosophy, and he has done that public a great service by relating philosophy and theology not only to one another, but to the problems of social and political life on whose solution hangs the future of our civilization.

BOOK REVIEWS

MEN, MONEY AND THE MINISTRY *

This important pamphlet is anonymous. Seventy-two clergymen and twenty-two laymen have signed the Foreword expressing general agreement with the main proposals, and this short list includes men of every considerable body of opinion in the Church and the nation. Yet this is no amorphous and composite document. There is as clearly one mind behind it as there is one vigorous style and tone throughout. Nor is the name of the actual writer any longer a secret for most people.

The pamphlet is chiefly concerned to advocate reform of the payment of the clergy. The present arrangement is in the first place inequitable, by whatever doctrine of distributive justice it is judged.

> 'It is indefensible—not least in a Christian community—that for the same size of job, so to speak, *A* is paid £1,800 per annum and *B* £300, or that *C* for the pastoral care of under 200 people is given £1,200, while *D* in charge of a parish of 20,000 gets £400. The offence is more conspicuous when such inequalities occur in neighbouring parishes. There is no economic sense in it, let alone morality' (p. 6).

As a direct consequence the Church is unable to place and use her men efficiently, according to their gifts and experience. No real planning is possible, since a candidate's financial needs and the stipend attached to the post must be the first considerations in the minds of patrons, be they individuals or Boards. All married clergymen, save the dwindling number with private means, must think of 'preferment' largely in terms of cash, and would be failing in their Christian duty to their families if they did not.

* *Men, Money and the Ministry. A Plea for Economic Reform in the Church of England.* (Longmans, Green & Co. 1937. Price 1/-.)

Careerism becomes almost a virtue. In addition, the pamphlet might well have more explicitly noted the hardship, and often the privation, and constant financial anxiety suffered by the lower paid incumbents, to the detriment of their work and at so much cost in health and happiness to their wives and themselves. Meantime, in contrast, bishops and cathedral dignitaries receive salaries ludicrously out of proportion to their needs.

> 'As things are, there is too wide a gulf between the standard of living—in appearances if not always in reality—of the higher clergy and that of the rank and file. It is prejudicial to *esprit de corps* among the clergy and leads to ecclesiastical worldliness' (p. 31).

> 'Diocesan bishops must be tired of explaining to the public that most of their income goes in expenses and not in joyous living. No doubt. But is it wise to continue that which requires so much explanation and leaves a lingering prejudice?' (p. 7).

The remedy proposed, for the incumbents, is the introduction of a basic rate of stipend with a sliding scale of allowances. The figures given in the pamphlet are provisional estimates based on the *Report on the Property and Revenue of the Church* (1924) and on an analysis of the economics of six sample Rural Deaneries. The basic rate is put at £350 per annum. There is an allowance for expenses graduated according to the size of the parish, with an upward limit of £100 per annum for parishes over 10,000. There is next a family allowance, which, on the pamphlet's reckoning, works out at £52 for a wife, £30 for each child under 13 and £60 for each older child (to meet the cost of higher education). Special allowances are also made for exceptionally large houses, for transport where necessary, and for the office of Rural Dean (£50). It is claimed that such a basic rate and scale of allowances could be found, save for £100,000 per annum, out of the total net incomes from parochial endowments, together with the unsecured but regular income of the Church, as these stood in 1924.

The salaries of the clergy, as to 90 per cent., derive from moneys which belong to individual parish churches. Redistribution must involve first some system of pooling. The system proposed is diocesan pools, with adjustments as between them, rather than one central pool, and this from fear of over-much centralization and on grounds of diocesan sentiment. Three comments may be made in passing. It may be doubted if there is sufficient diocesan sentiment to affect this issue, save in the new, small dioceses which are practically single towns. Many diocesan administrations would probably be more expensive than a central one. And the pamphlet might have greatly strengthened its case by pointing out that parish moneys could in effect be pooled without depriving each parish of its inherent prescriptive right to its agreed share in the pool. It is proposed that vicarages, and the cost of repairs and glebes, should be taken over by dioceses.

The pamphlet estimates the present expenditure on cathedrals at not less than £400,000 per annum, while the total of the gross incomes of the thirty-seven Diocesan bishops in 1921 was £168,341. No suggestion is made of what might be regarded as an adequate stipend for a bishop or other

dignitary, which omission we think a weakness. The three proposals made are that the salaries of dignitaries and the expenses of office should be separately provided for; that the salaries should be lower than at present, and that what saving is thus effected should be spent

> 'to endow a thinking and administrative staff for the Church, and not only for the Church of England, but for the Church of England throughout the world' (p. 38).

In this connection it may be observed that the pamphlet, in its opening pages, enunciates a principle of the widest application in the affairs not only of the Church but of the nation:

> 'It is not a Christian principle that increased spiritual responsibility should necessarily mean larger incomes or more worldly prestige' (p. 7).

This is well said. The problem of authority, which, in the ultimate analysis, lies behind the terrible conflicts and the almost as terrible political experiments in modern Europe, is unlikely to be solved in terms compatible with democratic ideals until the exercise of authority can be wholly separated from the holding of economic advantage over those under the authority.

The present reviewer whole-heartedly welcomes these main proposals, but, partly for that very reason, must criticize the pamphlet for having combined with its main theme, and in the space of only 55 small pages of large print, a discussion of the Parson's Freehold and the many difficult questions associated with it. Even the careful reader may easily obtain the impression that the pamphlet pleads for economic and administrative changes as interdependent parts of a single reform. If such an impression gains ground it may well prove fatal to any reform. The bedrock of the polity of the Church of England, and the envy of all thoughtful Nonconformists, into which is set the liberties of her clergy, is the incumbent's freehold right to his pulpit and his salary. It would be unrealistic in this naughty world to pretend that a clergyman can retain his spiritual and intellectual liberty while surrendering his right to his income into the hands of the administrators of a salary-pool. The pamphlet makes no such pretence, but all in a breath it has advocated diocesan pooling of salaries and episcopal power, under conditions, to move men about. With the diocesan pool virtually in his control, a bishop would have the power and to spare. Some modification of the Parson's Freehold may be desirable, but this must be secured by careful changes in the law of Church and State, without interference with a clergyman's right to his pulpit and salary if he keeps the law as interpreted by the judiciary of the State.

Granted the principle of the scheme, there is room, naturally for much difference of opinion as to the best method of carrying it out. The question of diocesan pools has already been noted. More serious are the legal difficulties in the way of pooling and redistributing moneys all of which belong to individual parishes, chapters, or sees, and the actuarial difficulty of calculating variable family allowances out of a total fixed income. In our opinion, the difficulties of the pamphlet's method are not insuperable. As to the figures given in these pages, they do not allow for the operation of

the latest Tithe Act and they will be further affected by the buying out of mining royalties. These financial changes for the worse make the need for reform more urgent. Nor does the pamphlet discuss the position of the clergyman with private means under its proposals. Most of such questions are for experts. The point at the moment is whether the Church will accept or reject the principle of the scheme, *i.e.* a basic rate for the clergy with allowances for special needs. The answer depends chiefly on the clergy, and it would be excellent if they could indicate it quickly. Were it evident they desired the scheme in principle, the Commission of the Assembly now sitting on Parochial Endowments would find itself presented with a clear policy which it is fully competent to apply in the best way. The State for its part is more likely to be sympathetic to a sound, all-round scheme of financial reform for the whole Church than to piecemeal interferences with endowments.

The pamphlet is careful from first to last to stress that what is at stake is more than an economic question.

> 'Courageously and thoroughly carried out (the scheme) would, we are persuaded, release much spiritual power. For the Spirit of God always breaks into human life conspicuously at the point of action — when men and groups do without fear or delay what they know is right' (p. 3).

Whatever the fate of this scheme in the hands of our generation of clergy, whatever the answer we may each be compelled in honesty to give to its proposals, it is surely the plain duty of every clergyman most carefully to examine it and to answer its direct and personal question with both his mind and his conscience.

M. T. DUNLOP.

MISS M. D. PETRE'S *APOLOGIA* *

This is a very great book, much too great for any contemporary notice to do it justice. Nearly half of it is occupied with an account of the author's childhood and adolescence as a member of an ancient Roman Catholic family, within a circle of associations and influences which will be wholly unfamiliar to the majority of English readers. Yet there is no effect of disproportion in this extended and minute analysis of formative forces. The story of a spiritual Odyssey marked by high courage and adventure had already its beginnings within those forces and grew almost inevitably out of them. Hence their importance for the story itself.

But the earlier half of Miss Petre's book is not merely descriptive or reminiscent. She is not content to recall the past out of which she has grown, only to live it over again. She recalls in order to contrast and to judge. She retains in an unusual degree the power of sympathetic contact with each immediate present. Life is an affair of judgment. But if it is to be just judgment, it must be formed from within a living experience and not merely imposed from without in obedience to the dictates of some conventional moral code. It is because Miss Petre naturally possesses and

* *My Way of Faith.* By M. D. Petre. (Dent. 1937. Price 10/6.)

does not need to simulate the kind of sympathy with varying phases of opinion and forms of action which penetrates at once to whatever is sound and healthy in them that her judgments are so just and discriminating. The importance of this first part of her book, the justification of what might otherwise seem its excessive length, is that it shows just how the influences of her early religious training and her reactions to them helped to develop in her what was no doubt already a gift of nature.

Miss Petre's has been a life of quiet, persistent, courageous action, but of action which possessed these qualities because itself rooted in contemplation of the things that are abiding and eternal. Her 'way of faith' has consistently inspired her mode of action. She was a Modernist, as she herself defines a Modernist, before Modernism. She felt all the intellectual doubts, hesitations and difficulties which in and for our time beset the faith by which she lived. She knew that many others whose faith might be less resistent than her own must also feel them. And so her one aim was to demonstrate the compatibility of the faith which is a deep and inexpungable intuition with the doubt which is a necessary and often legitimate accompaniment of every exercise of the analytical reason. This was, for her, to be a Modernist, and she was one. And she has survived the Modernism condemned by Leo X's Encyclical as the unrepentant advocate and exponent of the same method of preserving the faith for a new generation with its new doubts and difficulties added to those of the old. For this book does not end with its account of the Modernism of a generation ago, the Modernism whose problem still remains, though its particular solution of the problem was condemned by authority. It advances with the old frankness and courage into the new world which has arisen out of the Great War to meet what may be still graver problems for the faith, problems no longer of the enfranchised mind but of the common will hypnotised into subservience to the Totalitarian State. Even here Miss Petre can preserve her customary breadth and fairness of judgment. She can acknowledge what not everyone would be willing to acknowledge lest perchance it might be true:

> 'There is a great deal in Fascism, as in Communism, besides its totalitarianism; indeed, either might eliminate this character and survive.'

But she can see also, and is surely justified in underlining, the irony of the situation when what is altogether reprehensible in the new State, its determination to crush out all independence of judgment, has its counterpart and example in the imposition by the Church of the anti-Modernist oath.

Miss Petre writes of the Modernist movement in the Roman Church as the sole surviving representative of its aims and motives. To work within the Church for the deepening and enlargement of its own spiritual character and for its intellectual assimilation of new truth and knowledge gained in alien fields — that was the programme of Modernism. The problems involved were thus of two kinds. Miss Petre distinguishes them as inner and

outer problems, those which it was fully within the competence of the Church to solve because they arose out of a wider or narrower view of her own constitution and essential character and those which it was beyond her power to solve out of hand because they arose out of knowledge gained in fields of research over which she had no control. The official condemnation of Modernism as the compendium of all heresies made no distinction between these two classes of problems. But Miss Petre justly points out that, according to the strictest interpretation of the import of ecclesiastical decisions, the Modernist solutions of some of the first class of problems were not finally and irrevocably condemned by the exact wording of the Encyclical. As to the outer problems, the problems raised by the findings of science and Biblical criticism, they continued and continue to exist in spite of the Church's condemnation of the Modernist attempt to solve them. They arose in the moment that the first convinced believer in the Christian faith had to face the fact that certain conclusions of Biblical criticism must be accepted as true. Some solution of the difficulty that henceforth pressed upon his conscience was for him imperative. It was the search for such a solution that made and kept him a Modernist.

> 'So soon,' says Miss Petre, 'as he gave up knowledge in the interests of his faith, or faith in the interests of his knowledge, he gave up Modernism as a lost cause.'

Miss Petre has steadily refused to do either, and therefore in her, though openly in her almost alone, Modernism still survives in the Roman Catholic Church.

But this book is no mere record of the past, nor is it only, though it is certainly that also, the anxiously impartial judgment of a past of which the author was herself a great part. It is throughout the revelation of an indomitable courage and an inflexible loyalty, courage to pursue the truth wherever the quest might lead, loyalty to the Church which had, the author believes, by what is most fundamental in its teaching imposed that quest upon her and by what is most inexorable in its discipline trained her to its constant pursuit. For her the Church is not an enclosure, a place of safety in which one is shut away from all contact with a dangerous and evil world.

> 'I am not enclosed,' she says, 'in the sense of having no part, no sympathy, with those who, not only are not Catholics, but are even very much the contrary. I am not enclosed in the sense of breathing only the atmosphere of faith, for I breathe also the atmosphere of unbelief. I am not enclosed in the sense of drawing all my spiritual and intellectual sustenance from the doctrines of the Church — from the intellectual life of the outside world I learn things that help me to the better understanding of God as well as man. I am not enclosed in the sense of thinking that only the Church can speak to us of eternal truth, for I know that she herself has sat at the feet of teachers who never bowed to her authority.'

'And yet,' she adds, 'I am enclosed — I am within the fold. I reckon myself among the faithful within the fold, whatever some hostile critics may say, and nothing would induce me to leave it, not even that pressure

from within which is a trial, in its way, much greater than the pull from without.' Elsewhere she speaks, more positively still, of what the Church has been to her when she describes it as a road — 'the road to truth, not the fulness of truth itself,' the road where saints have trod, which indeed became a road for others because worn by their constant passing. So it is that this wayfarer to the City of God, the Church of the eternities, must find it by the road on which her feet were first planted to seek it.

A. L. Lilley.

A THIRTEENTH CENTURY REFORMER *

Mr. B. C. Boulter, a well-known contributor to the *Church Times*, belongs to that school of interpreters of the Middle Ages of which Mr. T. S. Eliot is the poet laureate. These Anglo-Catholic hagiographers write with a double purpose, to exalt the mediaeval Church and to show the essential continuity of Anglicanism (rightly understood and interpreted, of course) with the Church of Becket and St. Hugh and Grossetête. It is not a very easy position to maintain; the defection of Mr. Chesterton and of Sheila Kaye Smith proves that. Roman Catholics have been horrified during the last few months at the lack of sympathy, to use the mildest expression possible, shown by Anglo-Catholics with the Church militant in Spain; they cannot understand why murder in the cathedral was so damnable in the twelfth and is so excusable in the twentieth century.

> 'Among the modern buildings in Oxford are side by side the Blackfriars House of the Romans and the Anglican Pusey House. Some day, perhaps, a doorway will connect the two. When — who knows?' (p. 14).

Not yet awhile, to judge by the polemics between the *Church Times* and the *Tablet*.

Grossetête is a good subject for an Anglo-Catholic who desires to stress the first as well as the second part of the hyphenated expression. He did at times take a very strong anti-papal line.

> 'He made an investigation, Matthew Paris says, of the incomes drawn by foreigners from the Church of England, which showed that the present Pope, Innocent IV, had impoverished the Catholic Church more than all his predecessors. The incomes of the foreign clerics appointed by him in England amounted to more than seventy thousand marks, three times the revenue of the king' (p. 123).

The papacy in the thirteenth century was in dire need of money for the Crusades, for the desperate struggle it was carrying on against the Emperor, Frederick II, whom his admirers called *Stupor Mundi* and his enemies anti-Christ, as well as for the ever-growing staff of the papal court.

It must not be supposed, however, that Mr. Boulter's book is entirely polemical. It is, in fact, a good popular account of the foremost English ecclesiastic of the reign of Henry III. That reign of fifty-six years is in

* *Robert Grossetête, the Defender of our Church and of our Liberties.* Written and illustrated by B. C. Boulter. (S.P.C.K. 5/-. 1937.)

our ordinary English school-books almost a blank, a weary record of interminable and incomprehensible quarrels between the king and his nobles, enlivened just at the end by the meteoric career of Simon de Montfort. And yet for Europe in general, of which England was at that time a rather remote outlying province, it was the very heart of the Middle Ages, the epoch of the Franciscan revival, the springtide of scholasticism. English abbeys and cathedrals were rising in all their glory.

> 'When Grossetête became Bishop of Lincoln, the nave begun by Hugh de Wells was almost complete; Grossetête finished the building of its western end. He also built the lower part of the central tower, as that built by St. Hugh had fallen in 1237' (p. 72).

The fall of the tower was associated with the dispute of the reforming Bishop with his Dean and Chapter. This arrogant corporation refused to admit the Bishop as a Visitor; they said they had never been visited episcopally, and that they did not intend to institute a change. Not long afterwards a Canon of Lincoln vehemently denounced his Diocesan from the pulpit. Perhaps one reason why churches were better attended in the Middle Ages than they are at the present day was that the proceedings there were occasionally of a more sensational character than those to which we are accustomed. There was probably, for example, a good congregation when Henry II was scourged by the monks at Canterbury; the prospect of a red-hot sermon against the Bishop by a Canon Residentiary would be likely to draw a crowd in any cathedral city at the present day. On this occasion the incident had a sequel which was possibly miraculous and certainly brought down the house.

> '"Were we to be silent," he exclaimed, "the very stones would cry out for us!" Hardly had he uttered the words than the tower collapsed through the roof. Three people were killed' (p. 73).

Grossetête was involved in a good many disputes in the course of his life, with the Pope, with the King, with the monks who were always claiming immunity from episcopal supervision, with the Archbishop of Canterbury; he was a man, says Matthew Paris, to whom quiet was a thing unknown; on one occasion the monks of Christchurch, Canterbury, solemnly excommunicated him, as in our own days a missionary Bishop excommunicated an English Prelate. We cannot help suspecting that Grossetête must have been a little intractable. The Middle Ages to which so many to-day look back with fond regret was anything but a restful period; the thirteenth century in particular was as full of conflict as it was of vitality.

Mr. Boulter gives a very interesting account of Grossetête's relations to the contemporary intellectual revival which in its way was as important as what we generally call the Renaissance. He was a friend and patron of Roger Bacon. He learned Hebrew from a Jewish rabbi and Greek from a native of Greece whom he met at Paris. He translated into Latin the *Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs,* supposed at that time to be a portion of the Old Testament suppressed by the Jews. Mr. Boulter says that he

was the author of the Latin translation of *The Epistles of St. Ignatius*, discovered in 1646. Taking him for all-in-all, he was perhaps the greatest English ecclesiastic of the Middle Ages, and Mr. Boulter's book sets before Anglo-Catholics an example of fearlessness and love of truth well worthy of their study and imitation. GAMALIEL MILNER.

WANTED, A THEOLOGY*

This volume consists of a collection of eleven essays on associated theological subjects, and together they form a useful contribution towards that renovation of Christian theology which is so much needed.

That a certain prejudice against theology exists to-day cannot be denied. But clearly the 'hang-theology' school plays into the hands of the reactionaries, because no one can go on practising a religion, whether its cultus or its ethic, without some kind of intellectual acceptance of beliefs. Even the Sermon on the Mount rests upon beliefs about God and the purpose of human life; indeed apart from those definite beliefs the Sermon becomes impracticable idealism. Thus if the progressives do not provide a theology, they cannot wonder if people take refuge in those systems which already exist—whether of Aquinas or Calvin, which at least do *appear* to be watertight at first sight. And yet, of course, the trouble is with these systems that they are *not* watertight — not at any rate unless you grant them their premises, to do which is to beg the whole question. Dr. Wright puts our whole modern difficulty very clearly:

> 'The *malaise* of the modern religious mind is caused by the fact that two divergent series of principles and presuppositions are implicit, on the one hand in his theology, and on the other in his science. He is not always *conscious* of this diversity, hence so often a *malaise* instead of an antagonism or a rebellion. Diversity, however, there is. Such systems, for example, as those of Aquinas and Calvin are based upon what I would call a pre-scientific view of Holy Scripture. It is idle, in this connection, to point out the closely woven rational texture of each of these systems. The trouble with such rationalizations is not with the superstructure so much as with the assumptions upon which the superstructure is reared. They rationalize at the same time too freely and too niggardly. When the age demands reason they give authority; and it is no compensation for this gift to give reasons on matters where a certain modesty of restraint is felt instinctively to be desirable. The fact is that past theological systems are involved, to a far greater extent than is often acknowledged, with a view of Scripture which is now held only in obscurantist circles.'

That could not be better put. And it needs saying that the much-vaunted rationalism of the Catholics is a fake rationalism, *i.e.* a reasoning in isolation from facts.

Dr. Wright also examines the Thomist, orthodox, distinction between the two modes of knowledge—natural and supernatural ('the modal duality of knowledge,' he appropriately calls it). Aquinas distinguishes between

* *Modern Issues in Religious Thought.* By Charles J. Wright, B.D., Ph.D. (The Epworth Press. 3/6.)

first 'a knowledge revealed by God,' and second 'philosophic science built up by human reason.'

> 'As a consequence of this duality,' comments Dr. Wright, 'the present age, which finds that all its increase of knowledge comes by the strivings and intuitions of the human mind, is debarred from claiming any of its achievements and insights as "revelation," and is called upon by the protagonists of this traditionalist view to look backwards in time to a specific date and to specific circumstances when "revelation" was given, unknown, and for ever unknowable to ourselves. The "Catholic," in order to avoid the awkward intellectual situation which then results — a situation which is tantamount to atheism, since a God who does nothing might as well not exist — has created the still more curious, though entirely coherent and logical in its setting, notion that revelation has now been entrusted to an institution, or to the heads thereof, whose *ex cathedra* utterances have the same quality of "revelation" as has belonged to the "revelations" given of old.'

What is needed to replace this theory of an inspiration put, so to speak, into commission is some fresh and psychologically credible theory of how knowledge in the religious sphere is attained. Is it not attained in much the same way as knowledge in the closely parallel sphere of art is attained? And yet in the sphere of art no one imagines it to be necessary to contrast naturally acquired and supernaturally acquired knowledge — perhaps because in this sphere no vested interest in such a theory has ever been permitted to grow up (though in primitive times the artist was regarded as being inspired by some god, in precisely the same way as the priest or seer).

Of course, according to the Catholic theory the dualism between natural and supernatural is applied in all spheres; for example in the sphere of external happenings there are naturally caused events and supernaturally caused events, or miracles. But upon this duality of divine activity (for presumably God is held responsible for natural happenings as well as supernatural), the best comment is that it 'can neither be scientifically discerned nor religiously perceived.'

Thus if we declare for the necessity of theology, 'it is important that we state what kind of theology we conceive to be necessary.' And here Dr. Wright, quite rightly, joins issue with those who affect to despise religious experience. It is one of the queerest of our modern theological affectations to adopt this superior attitude — perhaps because personal religious experience, often independent of institutions and sacraments, is the strong suit of Protestantism and Quietism (how afraid the Roman Catholics are of the latter is shown by the recent Jesuit attack on the posthumous work of the late Abbot Chapman). But in truth it is only a particular application of the general principle that *experience is always to be distrusted*. Why else should science be anathema if not because it is based on experience and so has no respect for *a priori* theories?

> 'The theology of the future will have to be at once more rational and more religious. More rational, in the sense that the scrutiny of reason must not be forbidden the domain of the presuppositions. More

religious, in the sense that religious insight and experience must be both the foundation and the inspiration of theology.'

Dr. Wright effectively pricks the bubble of what is misleadingly called 'corporate' authority, which in ecclesiastical circles is nothing but the joint authority of a number of individuals who have conspired together to believe the same things. It is clear that all notions of right and truth must originate in *individual* minds (a corporate mind is a monster unknown to psychology). The only 'authority' for any assertion as to what is right or true is the consciousness of individual men who have lived in the past or are living now. To realise this is to rip a big tear in the screen of ambiguous argumentation which is put up to protect the idea of *external* authority in religion. Dr. Wright does not mean that every man, however ignorant, can usefully be his own pope; what he means is that all external authority originated at one period or another with the authority of an individual. The authority of the Bible and of the Church go back to this.

> 'Both the *book* and the interpretative additions represented by *tradition* are but the mental, moral and spiritual consciousness of men expressed or externalised in language. Both book and tradition *represent* the consciousness of specific men . . . Every book is the record of the inner experience of some person or persons. What we call tradition — whether it be in the form of defined dogmas or in the form of undefined cult or ritual — is likewise a record of inner experience.'

Indeed the same principle as applies in art and science applies also in religion. It is the *individual* who makes fresh discoveries and so enriches the tradition which has produced him. But of course the traditionalists deny that fresh discoveries *can* be made in the sphere of religion; *all* has been revealed, and it only remains to make explicit what was already implicit — there is no place for the *new*, or for the creative individual who produces what is new. It is this theory, of course, and the practice based upon it, which has brought religion in Western Europe to its present moribund state which advertised 'revivals' will do little to cure. If science and art were similarly deprived of oxygen, they would be in a similar state of collapse.

This book is a fine, clear, straightforward exposition of principles. With consummate dexterity it shows the complete hollowness of much popular Catholic propaganda.

J. C. Hardwick.

ST. AUGUSTINE FOR THE GENERAL READER*

Ten years ago Dr. G. G. Coulton gave, and may we hope still gives, a course of extra-Tripos lectures to those undergraduates in Cambridge who were awakening to the fact that they were not only collectors of historical data, but also participators in humane studies. Among the books which came in for frequent reference was the *De Civitate Dei*, and it is largely owing to this introduction that many of us became, and still remain, confirmed Augustinians. But dogmatists and professional Apologists apart,

* *An Augustine Synthesis.* By Erich Przywara, S.J. pp. 496. (Sheed and Ward. 1936. 12/6.)

Augustine is for most Christian people neither the grave Doctor nor the devout Confessor, but a great Evangelical. He underwent his conversion; he compiled his life history; he demonstrated and cultivated a capacity for the human touch. His oft-told story, therefore, tires neither pulpit nor pew, and he vies with Luther, Wesley, and Lord Shaftesbury in what might today be called the publicity value of the exemplary individual. But it is only the saint's *Confessions* which is found in chaste leather and given a place on the study table; his older works, and they would fill many standard library shelves, have remained almost entirely unknown, and certainly unread. Yet in these days of cheap and inferior manuals of devotion, the booksellers' response to the demand for *objets pieuses,* it is something to have even the *Confessions* constantly reprinted. Now, thanks to this careful selection and splendid arrangement of Fr. Pryzwara of so large a number of Augustine's finest pages, it is possible for all who can read plain English to know and to appreciate much more of the Saint's contribution to the literature of faith.

The mind of St. Augustine is here presented to us under a well-ordered and progressive series of section headings. For example, 'Man to God' succeeds 'Man of God' and itself leads on to 'Man in God,' the title of the final section. It has its own descriptive sub-sections — 'Man-Untruth to God-Truth,' 'Man's Poverty to God's Abundance,' 'Man-Beggar to God-Goodness,' etc. The modern reader is given a fair chance by the adoption of this method, one which he can fully appreciate, and which at the same time remains truly scholastic. With more books of this kind in the hands of the clergy, we should probably have a timely revival of the Fathers in the pulpit, approached critically and constructively, alike arousing the cultural interest of the laity, and resulting in their spiritual benefit.

Standard English translations, such as those of Pusey's Library of Nicene Fathers and of the seventeenth century John Healey have been made full use of; entirely new renderings have also been made by the editor himself, who, as a true humanist, is as much at home in our language as he is in his native German or in Augustine's Latin. Many of the extracts are of considerable length, while others, carefully placed in the framework referred to, lose nothing by their brevity.

> 'Dost thou hold wisdom to be anything other than truth, wherein we behold and embrace the supreme good?'
>
> 'O eternal truth, and true Charity, and lovely Eternity! Thou art my God, to Thee do I sigh day and night.'
>
> 'Lo, thou art far from God, O man, and God is far above man. Between them the God-Man placed Himself. Acknowledge Christ, and through Him as Man ascend to God.'
>
> 'Fear God that ye may not retrogress; love Him that ye may progress.'

These, and many other quotations from the Epistles and Sermons of the Saint, deserve to be as well-known as are the more familiar passages of the *Confessions.*

The compiler of this Synthesis, who is a Jesuit of great reputation in Germany, contributed an outstanding essay to the recent symposium, 'A Monument to St. Augustine.' His present work is ably introduced and warmly commended to his fellow-religionists in this country by Fr. C. C. Martindale. What Fr. Cuthbert, O.F.C., has done for St. Francis and the Dominicans are doing for St. Thomas, Fr. Przywara's Order is in a peculiarly fitting position to accomplish for St. Augustine. For this they would earn the lasting gratitude of many, not least of those English Churchmen who so prize that double blessing of truth and goodness, which only the scholar who is the devotee can bestow. J. R. BATEMAN.

DARWINISM AND ITS CRITICS*

This little book was published two years ago, and the occasion for it was the prominence given in the newspapers at the time to a speech attacking the theory of Evolution and defending the scientific accuracy of the first chapter of *Genesis*. So long as there are people whose general education has been so neglected, books of this type will be needed. Sir Arthur Keith is an acknowledged authority on Evolution, and what he says about the general acceptance of the theory by all scientific people is of course true. He also emphasizes rightly the genuine pursuit of truth by scientists, and the great labours spent in that pursuit. We could wish that everyone, and perhaps especially the clergy, could find time to read, not merely such small summaries of conclusions as this book offers, but larger books which show the weight of the evidence. Perhaps the *Origin of Species* would frighten many people by its size, but lighter works such as Darwin's *Voyage of the Beagle,* or even his little book on *Earthworms,* would show the diligence and skill that lay behind his theory. In a way, such old classics are more important for study of scientific method than later and more up-to-date works. Probably the greater number of educated Englishmen to-day think in terms of Evolution, and it is well that they should know the steps by which Evolution as a biological theory has been established; just as it is desirable that modern scientists should acknowledge their indebtedness to Aristotle.

It would be a mistake to infer from reading this book that any responsible body of English clergy hold to the scientific value of *Gen.* i. A comparison of the Creation stories of the Hebrews with those of the Babylonians, which enters into all theological courses, is sufficient to show that the value of *Gen.* i is to be found in its spiritual lessons and not in its science.

It is very disappointing to pass from the earlier chapters, in which Sir Arthur Keith deals with Biology, to the later chapters in which he deals with the Bible and Theology. There he shows himself as ill-informed as the Fundamentalists are about Science. The old conflict between Science and Religion must be studied from both sides, and while a few theologians have had a scientific training, very few if any scientists have had a theo-

* *Darwinism and its Critics.* By Sir Arthur Keith. (Watts & Co. 1935. 1/-.)

logical training. Sir Arthur speaks of the prophets of old as writing with the dogmatism of ignorance. If he had studied *Isaiah* he would have known that that prophet stood head and shoulders above all his contemporaries, not only in religious insight, but also in statesmanship and wisdom. And when he speaks of the God of the Hebrews having become a mere abstraction before the time of Christ, he betrays a lack of knowledge of the later books of the Old Testament and the Pseudepigrapha.

It is important that scientists should realize that we are not particularly concerned to establish the existence of God as the First Cause. If that were all, we should make more use of the argument from the Second Law of Thermodynamics. In lay language, that Law says that the world as we know it is running down, from which might be drawn the conclusion that it must once have been wound up. But what we are much more interested in is the interpretation of moral values seen in the world to-day. Whence comes the devotion to truth that scientists are noted for? Why is truth better than lying, or humility than pride? What is the significance of the instinct for self-sacrifice? These are questions that Science as such does not deal with, but the existence of such moral ideas needs explanation, and Religion seeks to give the explanation. If in offering an explanation Religion enters realms untouched by Science, there is no reason for scientists to complain or even to be sceptical. It is only going beyond the realm of Science as Biology goes beyond the realm of Chemistry and Physics. The same utter devotion to truth is needed in Theology as in Science; and there will be no quarrel between the two subjects of study if theologians and scientists both recognize that the others are actuated by the same high principle.

Devotion to the truth demands that each scholar should be the most downright critic in his own department of knowledge. Acting on which principle, the reviewer wishes to draw attention to the one really serious error in the Biblical account of Creation — serious because it is wrong religiously as well as physically — that God rested on the sabbath day from all His work which He had created and made. L. E. Browne.

THE PROBLEM OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL*

Comparatively few books dealing with the Fourth Gospel have appeared in the last few years. It looks as though criticism had almost come to a deadlock. Cogent reasons have been given against the traditional view of its authorship, and in the opinion of most scholars it can no longer be regarded as a historical work in the same sense that St. Mark, for instance, is so regarded; but when the critics have made alternative suggestions as to its date, authorship, and character, they have failed to reach any measure of agreement. Were there two men named John prominent in the Church of Ephesus, as some of the Fathers, perplexed by the Apocalypse, suggest? Is it still possible, in view of traces of certain genuine historical reminis-

* *The Authorship of St. John's Gospel.* By the Rev. John Donovan, S.J. (Burns, Oates and Washbourne Ltd. 10/6.)

cence, to see the witness of John the son of Zebedee behind the work of a later Hellenistic writer? Can we discern definite signs that the author used sources? And is the difficulty of interpreting the book due to the failure of the final redactor to understand the allegorical character of some of the sources which he used? Or again, is ecclesiastical tradition wholly mistaken, and is the Gospel a typical Alexandrian work which by some accident became associated with the Church of Ephesus? These and many other questions have been asked, but there seems to be no way in which they may be finally answered, and so there has been a distinct tendency in recent years to turn from the critical study of the Fourth Gospel, and to explore fields in which more definite conclusions may be reached.

In the circumstances it is not surprising that the upholders of the traditional view take fresh courage. If the critics cannot agree, may it be that they are all wrong, and that the simplest solution of the problem is after all the best? There are difficulties involved in any view, but the ascription of the Gospel to John the son of Zebedee has tradition in its favour, and unless it is disproved by the available evidence it has a certain right to hold the field.

Among determined defenders of the old view was Father Donovan, whose work in the field of Johannine criticism has been collected and edited by Father Sutcliffe, Professor of Holy Scripture at Heythrop College. The book before us is the result. It suffers considerably from the fact that it is a collection of articles, most of which have appeared in periodical publications. The argument lacks coherence, and there is a great deal of repetition. Moreover, the writer deals almost exclusively with the external evidence, which presents only half of the problem. Admittedly the Johannine authorship is strongly attested in the Fathers. Were it not for the intrinsic difficulties involved, the witness of Irenaeus might be considered conclusive; and when, in the latter part of the second century, the book was definitely ascribed to the Apostle, only a few heretics seem to have raised any objection. So Father Donovan, by dealing almost exclusively with the external evidence, has set himself a fairly easy task. He insists on the weakness of the evidence for the early death of John; he examines the Papias fragment, and concludes that it refers to one John and not two; he contends that Justin derived his Logos doctrine directly from the Fourth Gospel; and, above all, he enlarges on the testimony of Irenaeus who claims to have been in touch through Polycarp with the apostolic age itself.

That the argument has force cannot be denied, but in the absence of any attempt to meet, or even to appreciate, the difficulties which have impressed the 'Higher Critics' it will scarcely carry conviction. On the first page the writer makes an unfortunate start in dubbing all who disagree with him 'Rationalists,' and throughout his chapters there is a suggestion of special pleading which shakes the confidence of the reader. On p. 37 he goes so far as to admit that 'the Gospels do not necessarily reproduce the *ipsissima verba* of our Lord,' but in general his conservatism is of a very rigid type. Unconscious assumptions keep creeping in. He makes the common mistake of assuming that 'the three Synoptic Gospels were in circulation at the time when the Fourth was committed to writing.' How does he know? That the Gospel and the First Epistle are by the same author is stated to be undeniable, although Professor Dodd has virtually disproved that view. He affirms confidently that the whole of Chapter XXI, even verse 24, is the work of the Apostle John. *Petitio Principii* is apparent, as on page 16, where it is asserted that the reference to the disciple whom Jesus loved, who rested on the bosom of Jesus, followed up in

references occurring in the Christian Fathers, 'definitely settles the question of the authorship of the Fourth Gospel.' It is not undeniable that the author of the First Epistle, when he says 'What we have heard and seen with our eyes, what we touched and our hands felt,' is necessarily proclaiming his own *personal* experiences. Throughout the book the evidence is overstrained. It is too much to say that throughout the second century 'The Fourth Gospel was in general use, having been known to Papias and quoted by St. Ignatius in his letters' (p. 128), or that because Justin writes 'the Revelation was made to a certain man *among us*' he meant that John the son of Zebedee was resident at Ephesus (p. 133). There is some good evidence in support of the author's contention, such as that of Polycrates of Ephesus, though it is not early enough to be quite conclusive, but nothing is gained by exaggerating the testimony of earlier writers.

The author's style is controversial, and he has little respect for 'the Rationalists' (Bacon, Streeter, Moffatt, and the rest); but his own work suffers from an undue regard for the authority of tradition. Had he been a scientific historian, and not (as he so often informs us) a specialist in Greek Prose composition, he would have used the argument from tradition with more caution. Almost anything could be believed in the second century, and the laws of evidence were little regarded. When he writes that on a matter of literary criticism Tertullian, 'the possessor of a highly-trained and critical mind,' is to be preferred to the critics of to-day, one is bound to distrust his judgment. It is strange to find references to the heretic 'Ebion'; here at least Tertullian is not to be trusted.

P. GARDNER-SMITH.

THE FIRST AUSTRALIAN BISHOP*

During the last hundred and fifty years the Church of England has expanded into the Anglican Communion. Before 1784 the few clergy working overseas belonged to the diocese of London, though they cannot have seen much of their diocesan. In 1784 a bishop was provided (through the Scottish Episcopalian Church) for the United States, an English succession being conferred three years later. In 1787 a bishop was also consecrated for Canada and in 1814 for the large diocese of Calcutta, which included Australia; in 1836 Australia received a bishop for itself, and in 1847 a bishop was provided for South Africa. This volume tells the story of the beginning of the Church in Australia, and its author is a clergyman who has served in that church with distinction for nearly sixty years.

In 1788 a batch of convicts was transported to Australia; the government did not forget the spiritual needs of those whose transportation was required by the social needs of the home country, and an Evangelical clergyman, a Mr. Johnson, was sent out with the convicts; he stayed in Australia for some years and in 1794 was joined by another Evangelical, the Rev. Samuel Marsden, who remained there till his death in 1838 and in the course of this ministry evangelised New Zealand.

For the better organisation of the clergy in Australia an Archdeacon was appointed at a salary of £2,000 a year and with a place on the Legislative and Executive Councils. The second holder of this office, appointed in 1829, was William Grant Broughton, an incumbent in the diocese of Winchester and a member of the pre-Tractarian old-fashioned high church school represented by Joshua Watson and the 'Clapton sect.'

In 1836 Dr. Broughton became the first Bishop of Australia. He lived

* *William Grant Broughton*, Bishop of Australia. By F. T. Whitington, Emeritus Archdeacon of Hobart. (Angus and Robertson. 7/6.)

to see this diocese divided by the formation of the sees of New Zealand (1841), Tasmania (1842), and Melbourne, Adelaide and Newcastle (1847). In 1850 the six bishops met in order to organise what was regarded as the Church of England in Australia; in 1852 Bishop Broughton came to England to further this object and died during this visit.

The biography suggests that the first Bishop of Australia was a man of vision, courage and statesmanship, though reserved and autocratic. He does not seem to have had the magnetic personality of the first Bishop of New Zealand (Selwyn) or the first Bishop of Melanesia (Patteson). It seems that the development of the Church in Australia has not proceeded on the lines that he desired, either as the director of a state system of religious education or as the Established Church of England transplanted to Australia: but he laid the foundations of the Australian church in spite of difficulties that would have been too much for many men.

The book also throws light upon the religion of the English layman a century ago and on the ideals of the old High-church party whose work has been obscured by the fame of the new High-church movement that began in Oxford in 1833.

There are a few errors in the names of the leaders of the Evangelical party mentioned on pp. 2 and 11, and on p. 162 Mr. J. G. Hubbard seems to be described as the founder of St. Augustine's College, Canterbury, which, as is recognised on p. 129, was due to Mr. Beresford Hope.

By a coincidence this volume appeared about the same time as a life of Dr. Inglis, the first Bishop in Canada; the two biographies are a welcome sign that the solid work done by worthy representatives of the Church of England at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries is not ignored by those who study the past history of the Christian Church.

J. F. Clayton.

PRAYERS FOR EVERY DAY IN THE YEAR*

The following prayers taken from the *Diary of Private Prayer* of Dr. Baillie (author of *And the Life Everlasting*) will give the reader some idea of the character of this collection. Though the prayers possess a wide range of subjects, yet their personal intimacy precludes them from being entirely suitable for public worship. Their purpose is pre-eminently for private use and to help busy men and women with themes for thoughtful meditation and thankfulness. In this way they should prove to be of great spiritual value to many.

First Day. Morning.

O God, who hast been the Refuge of my fathers through many generations, be my Refuge to-day in every time and circumstance of need. Be my Guide through all that is dark and doubtful. Be my Guard against all that threatens my spirit's welfare. Be my Strength in time of testing. Gladden my heart with Thy peace: through Jesus Christ my Lord.

Second Morning.

Let me then put back into Thine hand all that Thou hast given me, rededicating to Thy service all the powers of my mind and body, all my worldly goods, all my influence with other men. All these, O Father, are Thine to use as Thou wilt. All these are Thine, O Christ. All these are Thine, O holy Spirit. Speak Thou in my words to-day, think in my thoughts, and work in all my deeds.

* *A Diary of Private Prayer.* By John Baillie, D.D., D.Litt., S.T.D. (Oxford University Press. 3/6. 1936.)

TWENTY-FOURTH DAY. EVENING.

Now unto Thee, O heavenly Father, be all praise and glory that day by day Thou dost richly fill my life with various blessings:
A home to share, kindred to love, and friends to cherish:
A place to fill and a work to do:
A green world to live in, blue skies above me, and pure air to breathe:
Healthy exercise and simple pleasures:
My race's long history to remember and its great men to follow:
Good books to read and many arts and crafts to delight in:
So much that is worth knowing and the skill and science to know it:
Those high thoughts that sometimes fill my mind and come I know not whence:
Many happy days, and that inward calm that Thou givest me in days of gloom:
The peace, passing understanding, that comes from Thine indwelling in my soul:
The faith that looks through death and the hope of a larger life beyond the grave.

TWENTY-NINTH DAY. EVENING.

Forbid it, O Father, that the difficulty of living well should ever tempt me to fall into any kind of heedlessness or despair. May I keep it ever in mind that this human life was once divinely lived and this world once nobly overcome and this body of flesh, that now so sorely tries me, once made into Thy perfect dwelling-place.

Show Thy lovingkindness to-night, O Lord, to all who stand in need of Thy help. Be with the weak to make them strong and with the strong to make them gentle. Cheer the lonely with Thy company and the distracted with Thy solitude. Prosper Thy Church in the fulfilment of her mighty task, and grant Thy blessing to all who have toiled to-day in Christ's name.

This little volume is beautifully bound and printed and very suitable to give to older confirmation candidates and to ordinands. The reviewer has been so much impressed with the book that he has followed the advice he is giving. H.D.A.M.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman*

THE MIRACLES OF CHRIST.

SIR,

Dr. C. J. Wright in his reply to some of my remarks in your last issue wishes me 'to apply the principle of symbolical interpretation to the *whole* narrative of our Lord's Temptation.' But seeing that I have already virtually done so, the suggestion seems somewhat superfluous. I said, 'The story'—meaning to include under that all the three specially recorded temptations—'is our Lord's own characteristic way of describing the nature of the dread inward struggle through which His soul had passed.' As I take it, therefore, the temptation to turn stones into bread was, when we spiritually interpret it, the temptation to use the powers which He possessed over and beyond those of other men for purely personal ends—a

temptation which must have continually assailed Him, though in various forms, throughout the whole of the subsequent ministry. It may also, when He was in the wilderness, have assumed the form of a temptation to provide Himself, in some so-called supernatural manner, with actual food, though of this one cannot be sure.

Of course, everything here depends upon whether we believe that our Lord was, or was not, possessed of the powers just referred to. Surely, however, it ought to be possible to approach a question of this kind with minds free from all bias—from the bias of those who say 'everything that we find stated in the Gospels is to be accepted straight away without further criticism,' and from the bias, on the other hand, of those who are only too ready to fall in at once with Matthew Arnold's dictum, 'miracles do not happen.' What inclines so many, I think, to take the latter line is that their minds are still haunted, unconsciously perhaps, by the false materialistic philosophy of last century, which recent advances in the natural sciences, especially physics and biology, have done so much to undermine, and which the late Professor J. S. Haldane in his Gifford Lectures (1927) stigmatized as 'nothing better than a superstition on the same level as a belief in witches.' Does nothing in this amazing Universe of ours ever happen—'emerge,' as Professor Lloyd Morgan would say—but what can be completely accounted for by all the happenings which have preceded it?

Miracles, no doubt, have been reported in connection with other religious systems outside Christianity, but my contention is that the peculiarities which distinguish our Lord's reported miracles are sufficient — after being subjected, if you like, to *legitimate* criticism — to set them in a class by themselves. These peculiarities I have dwelt on at considerable length in my book, beginning at page 66.

But there is another point and a highly important one. If on other grounds, wholly unconnected with the subject of miracles, we have come to believe in our Lord as the supreme manifestation in human form of the very Heart and Purpose and Will of God, then, although some perhaps may not be prepared to accept the Nicene symbol in its full literal sense, it may nevertheless seem to such only congruous with our Lord's unique revelation if certain occurrences of a correspondingly unique kind should have accompanied it, and especially if they happened to be in perfect harmony with His holy character and teaching — His utter unselfishness, His avoidance of everything in the shape of mere display, and His constantly outflowing sympathy towards all who were suffering and in need of help.

It is quite true that Matthew Arnold, in his chapter on 'The Proofs from Miracles' in *Literature and Dogma,* does not on the same page and in so many words compare our Lord's miracles to the turning of 'a pen into a penwiper,' but it is implied all the same, for otherwise why employ such an illustration in the very chapter in which the Gospel miracles are being discussed? It is as clear as clear can be that he had no other thought of the general character of our Lord's miracles than that, like all other recorded miracles the world over, they were, if they really happened, no more than cases of mere thaumaturgy. There is no suggestion in his chapter of their having possessed any spiritual significance or of their standing in any intimate relation with our Lord's divine Personality. One calls to mind Gladstone's somewhat humorous remark about Arnold, that 'he combined a sincere devotion to the Christian religion with a faculty of presenting it in such a form as to be recognizable by neither friend nor foe.'

15 Moreton Road, Oxford. JOHN H. BEST.

DR. WRIGHT'S REPLY.

SIR,

I have said all I wish to say on Mr. Best's book. In deference, however, to the demands of courtesy I have, with reluctance, to add something about his last letter.

Mr. Best's first paragraph shows that he still wants to have it both ways. Sooner or later he will have to try to make up his mind whether Jesus was, or was not, tempted 'to provide Himself, in some so-called supernatural manner, with actual food.' If he decides that Jesus was not so tempted, he will want to re-write large sections of his book.

Mr. Best's second paragraph is as confused as his first. Every student ought to know that it is not a 'materialistic philosophy' which compels nearly all modern Christian thinkers to relinquish the historicity of 'turning water into wine,' satisfying the physical hunger of a vast number of people with a few handfuls of food, etc. Nor can this issue be settled by an appeal to Christology.

Now that Mr. Best retracts his previous mis-statement about Matthew Arnold, I must further point out that the comparison of our Lord's miracles to the turning of a pen into a penwiper is *not* 'implied all the same.' Matthew Arnold was one of the first of our English theological writers to maintain that all the miracles of the Gospels do not stand or fall together. He drew attention, two generations before his modern detractors, to what he called 'moral therapeutics'; and maintained that in the Gospels 'indications enough remain to show the line of the Master, his perception of the large part of moral cause in many kinds of disease, and his method of addressing to this part his cure.' Like Mr. Best—who unknown to himself is much indebted to Matthew Arnold and kindred writers—the author of *Literature and Dogma* accepted some 'miracles' and rejected others. But I fear the indebtedness is indirect; for Mr. Best has made it even more evident than it was before that he is quite unacquainted with what Matthew Arnold did say. The sentence beginning 'It is as clear as clear can be' would be more correct if it began 'Nothing can be less clear than.' So far from having 'no other thought of the general character of our Lord's miracles than that, like all other recorded miracles the world over, they were, if they really happened, no more than cases of mere thaumaturgy'—which Mr. Best declares was the view of Matthew Arnold—the maligned, and presumably unread, author maintained, speaking of the so-called 'healing miracles' of Jesus: 'the action of Jesus in these instances, however it may be amplified in the reports, was real; but it is not, therefore, as popular religion fancies, thaumaturgy,—it is not what people are fond of calling the *supernatural,* but what is better called the *non-natural.* It is, on the contrary, like the grace of Raphael, or the grand style of Phidias, eminently natural; but it is above common, low-pitched nature. It is a line of nature not yet mastered or followed out.'

Perhaps this correspondence will not be without profit if it leads some readers of the *Modern Churchman* to look up the books, so often spuriously quoted to-day, of writers who are not alive to defend themselves. I little dreamed a few weeks ago that I should be called on to be a defender of Matthew Arnold. The issues confronting Christian thinkers are too important to spend time debating what our grandfathers thought, yet when one of these is quoted so as to be made to say what he did not say, it is the duty of every truthful man to enter an emphatic protest. Such tactics

have brought apologetic writings into their present disrepute. From that moral and intellectual discredit it is the task of the modern Christian to rescue theology.

C. J. WRIGHT.

Didsbury College, Manchester.

SIR,

The subject of Christ's Temptation having been raised in the June number of the *Modern Churchman*, may I set forth a view of the whole matter — the temptation in connection with the miraculous — which I have not met with elsewhere. The story is an allegory setting forth 'the dread inward struggle' in Christ's soul, when driven by the Spirit to promote the 'Kingdom of God' on earth, He retired to a lonely place to hold communion with His heavenly Father and to form His plan of campaign. The question heavy on His soul was how best should He promote the Kingdom of God. Two ways were open to Him — the way common to mankind in advancing any cause—the method of external organization—and the way He was to reveal of breathing into mankind, the Spirit, the power, the Kingdom of God. The ways of men in promoting any cause must be external, visible, material. The way of God is internal, spiritual, and consequently eternal. The external and material can only be temporal. 'The Kingdom of God is within you,' He taught. So that St. Paul afterwards, realizing the truth of Christ's teaching, declared, 'They that are led by the Spirit of God, they are the Sons of God.' How did we come by this allegory of the Temptation; either Christ Himself told the story to His disciples in this parabolic form, which men of His age might understand, or else He had spoken of the inward searchings of His soul and some narrator gave the story the form in which we have it.

The success of all human temporal things depends on the possession of three things — Property, Popularity, and Power, which men are tempted to fiercely covet. So Christ is tempted to use His Divine power to obtain these things to promote the Kingdom, and in so doing fall into the temptation common to all men.

Turn stones to bread miraculously, *i.e.* acquire Property. Cast yourself down from the height of God's house into the court of the people and miraculously survive. To the religious mind the Test of Divinity is the power to work miracles; this will acquire popularity. Then power may be grasped by using both these to the utmost, by worshipping the Prince of this world. Christ as man for man, in the power and spirit of God, withstood these temptations which are common to all mankind, and conquered, and He would teach us that man imbued with God's holy spirit may do the same. But what of the Holy Church — she has put the external kingdom first, has used her spiritual influence to obtain Property, Popularity and Power by pandering to men's superstitions and love of the miraculous. The result in the world we see; she has failed to promote the internal Kingdom of God and so failed to promote that peace which only comes to men of goodwill. The old saying of Jeremiah is still true, 'The prophets prophesy falsely and the priests bear rule by their means, and my people love to have it so; but what will ye do in the end thereof?'

C. N. SWAYNE.

Rye Bank,
Broadhurst,
Ashtead,
Surrey.